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Abstract
We survey the recent empirical and theoretical developments in the literature on the relation
between prices and exchange rates. After updating some of the major findings in the empirical
literature we present a simple framework to interpret this evidence. We review theoretical
models that generate insensitivity of prices to exchange rate changes through variable markups,
both under flexible prices and nominal rigidities, first in partial equilibrium and then in general
equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
The relation between prices and exchange rates is one of the classic topics studied in international
macroeconomics. This relation is of interest both from a positive and normative perspective.
One basic hypothesis connecting prices and exchange rates is that of relative purchasing power
parity (PPP): changes in prices of goods should be the same across locations when converted into
a common currency. Deviations in relative PPP can arise because of differences in the cost of
supplying the good to different locations or because firms price discriminate across locations by
charging different mark-ups. Since global efficiency requires that as long as changes in the cost of
making the good available to each location is the same the change in price should be the same, the
sources of deviations in relative PPP shed light on the efficiency (or lack of it) in the allocation of
goods across countries.
In addition to the cross country comparison of price movements, the magnitude of the response
of prices to exchange rates for an individual country, exchange rate pass-through (ERPT), is also
of interest to measure the extent of expenditure switching that follows exchange rate changes.
This is an important ingredient to understand how a devaluation of the currency can stimulate
the domestic economy by inducing substitution from foreign to domestic goods. Milton Friedman
made the case for exchange rate flexibility on the grounds that if prices are rigid in the producers
currency, a flexible exchange rate can bring about the same relative price movements as in a world
where nominal prices are fully flexible. On the other hand, if prices in the buyer’s local currency
are insensitive to changes in the exchange rate there are limited expenditure switching effects. The
extent of pass-through both in the short and long-run is therefore important to understand the
impact of exchange rate movements not only on prices but also on quantities and therefore welfare.
The relation between prices and exchange rates also helps shed light on positive issues such
as how firms’ prices respond to cost shocks. This is informative of the market structure the firm
operates in, the nature of the demand it faces, and the extent to which markets are segmented
across countries. The gradualness (or lack of it) with which firms respond to cost-shocks, in terms
of delayed adjustment, also contributes to our understanding of “real rigidities” (i.e. forces that
make firms reluctant to change their price relative to other firms’ prices) in the macro economy,
which play an important role in propagating money non-neutralities. The advantage of international
price data over the price data typically used in industrial organization or in closed economy macro
is that exchange rate shocks are arguably exogenous to the firm, are easily measurable, and exhibit
considerable time variation.
In this chapter we review both the empirical and theoretical work that sheds light on these
positive and normative issues, focusing on developments since the last Handbook chapter by Froot
and Rogoff (1995) on PPP. We first review and update the major findings in the empirical work. We
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distinguish between consumer prices (retail prices), producer prices (wholesale prices) and border
prices (at-the-dock). The new developments mainly involve bringing more disaggregated datasets,
generating new empirical facts alongside reinforcing several old ones.
After summarizing the empirical evidence we present a simple theoretical framework to help
interpret the facts. We first consider the partial equilibrium problem of a firm and the impact
of exchange rate movements on the pricing of the firm at the border and at the consumer level.
We analyze the case of flexible prices and sticky prices. We then aggregate these prices and study
the implications for aggregate price indices. Next we describe developments in the literature that
endogenizes variable mark-ups. This work builds on the basic insights of Dornbusch (1987) and
Krugman (1987) adding richer details such as firm heterogeneity, consumer search and matching,
distribution costs and inventories. These can be connected to industry-level data on market struc-
ture as well as micro data on firms and plants. Lastly, we describe a workhorse general equilibrium
model where exchange rates and wages are determined by monetary shocks and evaluate the success
of the model in matching the facts. In the conclusion we discuss what we learn from the literature
about the positive and normative issues raised at the start of this introduction.
The chapter is outlined as follows. Section 2 summarizes the empirical evidence, section 3
presents a simple framework to interpret the empirical evidence, sections 4 and 5 describe recent
theoretical models of variable mark-ups and other mechanisms that generate insensitivity of prices
to exchange rate changes. Sections 6 and 7 discuss industry equilibrium and general equilibrium
respectively.
2 Empirical Evidence
In this section we summarize five stylized facts on the relation between international prices and
exchange rates. We distinguish between international prices based on consumer prices, producer
prices and border prices and update several findings using recent data (1975-2011 conditional on
data availability) for eight major industrial countries (Canada, France, Germany, United Kingdom,
Italy, Japan, Switzerland and the U.S.). The data appendix available on the authors websites
provide details of data sources and describe how the statistics presented in this section were con-
structed.
The first finding characterizes the dynamics of consumer price index (CPI) based real exchange
rates (RER), that is the ratio of consumer prices across countries in a common currency, and its
relation to nominal exchange rates (NER).
Empirical Finding 1 Real exchange rates for consumer prices co-move closely with nominal ex-
change rates at short and medium horizons. The persistence of these RERs is large with long half
lives.
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Define the change in the bilateral CPI-based RER as the log change in the ratio of the CPI in
two countries i and n measured in a common currency:
∆rercpiin,t = ∆ein,t + ∆cpii,t −∆cpin,t.
Here, ∆cpii,t represents log changes in the CPI in country i at time t relative to time t − 1. It
is an expenditure weighted average of the change in retail prices consumers pay for goods and
services, including both domestically produced and imported items. ∆ein,t represents log changes
in the NER between countries i and n (units of currency n per unit of currency i). The change in
the trade-weighted RER for country n, ∆rercpin,t , is defined as a trade weighted average of bilateral
RERs for country n across its trade partners i.
Figure 1, Panel A, plots cumulative log changes in the trade-weighted NER and the trade-
weighted CPI-based RER for the U.S. between 1975 and 2011. The close co-movement between
the NER and the RER and the high persistence of the RER is visually apparent.
Table 1 displays standard deviations and correlations between RER and NER changes for eight
major industrialized countries. We report results based on four-quarter logarithmic changes in
relative prices, as well as for quarterly deviations from HP trends. The results in this table indicate
that changes in NERs and RERs are roughly as large and highly correlated. For the U.S., the
standard deviation of changes in the NER relative to those for the RER is 0.92, while the correlation
is 0.97.
The persistence of the trade-weighted RER is estimated using an AR(5) with a constant and no
time trend as in Steinsson (2008) for the 1975Q1–2011Q4 period.1 More specifically we estimate,
rercpin,t = β + αnrer
cpi
n,t−1 +
4∑
k=1
ψk∆rer
cpi
n,t−k + εt. (1)
Due to the high persistence of most RER series the grid bootstrap procedure in Hansen (1999) is
used to obtain a median unbiased (MU) estimate of αn, which is the sum of the AR coefficients.
The other AR parameters are estimated by OLS conditional on the MU estimate of αn. In Table
2 we report estimates and 90% confidence intervals of half-lives defined as the largest time T such
that the impulse response function IR satisfies IR(T − 1) ≥ 0.5 and IR(T ) < 0.5. We also report
the up-life that follows a similar definition with 0.5 replaced with 1 and measures the hump-shaped
behavior of RER deviations.
The half life estimate for 7 of the 8 developed countries is in the range of 3-9 years, the exception
being Switzerland with a half life of 1.6 years. These numbers are consistent with the survey in
Rogoff (1996) that concludes that the “consensus view” for the average half-life of RER deviations
is 3-5 years. Also as documented in Murray and Papell (2002) and Rossi (2005) the confidence
intervals on the half live estimates are very wide. In addition CPI-based RERs exhibit hump-shaped
1In calculating these statistics we use the codes from Steinsson (2008).
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impulse responses as documented in Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), Cheung and Lai (2000) and
Steinsson (2008).
The aggregate RER is by construction a composite of more disaggregated sectoral RERs. The
literature has used sectoral data to provide alternative measures of aggregate half-lives. Imbs et al.
(2005) highlight the potential importance of heterogeneity in sectoral level persistence in impacting
measures of aggregate RER persistence. To deal with heterogeneity they estimate the average
half life for a panel of sectoral real exchange rates using the Pesaran Mean Group estimator.
This estimator involves calculating (weighted) averages of AR(p) coefficients across a panel of
regressions, one for each sector, and then estimating the average half life using the averaged AR(p)
coefficients. They find it to be 11 months, well below the consensus estimates. Chen and Engel
(2005) alternatively calculate the average half life by first estimating half lives sector by sector
and taking a weighted average across these estimates. They show that the average persistence of
sectoral RERs is not very different from the consensus estimates.2
As a reconciliation Carvalho and Nechio (2011) show that the estimation procedures in Imbs
et al. (2005) and Chen and Engel (2005) measure different things. Using a model simulated to
generate heterogeneity in persistence of sectoral RERs, owing to heterogeneity in the frequency of
price adjustment,3 they demonstrate that the difference between the average of sectoral half-lives
and the aggregate half-life (as in Chen and Engel (2005)) is quite small. On the other hand the
Pesaran Mean Group estimator (used in Imbs et al. (2005)) calculates the half life for the aggregate
RER of a counterfactual one-sector economy with a frequency of price adjustment that matches
the average frequency of price adjustment of the multi-sector economy. The difference between this
estimate and the true estimate of the persistence of the aggregate RER for a multi-sector economy
can be quite large in the presence of sectoral heterogeneity.
Micro Data: The fact that there is high co-movement between real and nominal exchange rates has
also been established using disaggregated micro level price data for individual goods. Crucini and
Telmer (2012) use annual Economist Intelligence Unit data on retail prices for goods with similar
characteristics and show that on average product-level RERs co-move closely with the nominal
exchange rates. Gopinath et al. (2011) and Burstein and Jaimovich (2008) find similar evidence of
co-movement for the exact same UPC sold in the U.S. and Canada by the same retailer. Broda
and Weinstein (2008) find similar patterns using ACNielsen’s Homescan retail price database of
matched goods with a common barcode.
Despite the high co-movement of the product-level RERs and NER’s on average, micro level
prices exhibit large idiosyncratic movements. As highlighted in Crucini and Telmer (2012) NERs
2Chen and Engel (2005) and Reidel and Szilagyi (2005) argue that measurement error and small sample bias can
impact the estimates of Imbs et al. (2005). Imbs et al. (2004) argue against the importance of these biases.
3Kehoe and Midrigan (2007) document that while there is evidence in the data that the stickier the price of the
good the more persistent is its RER, the amount of variation is relatively modest.
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account for less than 10% of the deviations from relative purchasing power parity (PPP), defined as
the time series variation in good-specific law of one price deviations. The importance of the large
idiosyncratic component in goods price changes is consistent with the evidence from the closed
economy literature as surveyed in Klenow and Malin (2011).4
Border effect : Several studies have also compared the behavior of cross-country RERs to within
country RERs, with any differences attributed to the “border effect”. Engel and Rogers (1996) is
a seminal paper in this literature that documents a sizeable border effect for Canada and the U.S.
Identifying the “treatment effect” of the border on prices is difficult because the distribution of
prices in the absence of the border is typically not observable. Gorodnichenko and Tesar (2009)
highlight that ex-ante differences in countries can be misleadingly attributed to the border.5 In
addition, Gopinath et al. (2011) show that using the information contained in price differences
alone is useful only when markets are at least partly integrated. Gopinath et al. (2011) use an
alternative approach by studying the response of prices to cost shocks in neighboring markets to
compare market segmentation across and within countries.
Using UPC level micro data for the U.S. and Canada, Broda and Weinstein (2008) document as
much variation in retail prices across as within countries, while Gopinath et al. (2011) and Burstein
and Jaimovich (2008) find evidence of a sizeable border effect for consumer and wholesale prices.
While the two data sets are not strictly comparable, one factor that can explain the difference in
findings is that the data in Broda and Weinstein (2008) is from multiple retail chains, while the
data in Gopinath et al. (2011) and Burstein and Jaimovich (2008) is from the same retail chain.6
Empirical Finding 2 Movements in RERs for tradeable goods are roughly as large as those in
overall CPI-based RERs when tradeable goods prices are measured using consumer prices or producer
prices, but significantly smaller when measured using border prices.
The second stylized fact pertains to the importance of movements in relative prices of tradeable
goods across countries and movements in the price of nontradeable goods relative to tradeable goods
in accounting for fluctuations in the RER, motivated by the classic Salter-Swan traded/nontraded
goods dichotomy. We start by describing the evidence using aggregate price indices.
4Crucini et al. (2005) investigate the extent of variation in the level of retail prices for similar goods across countries
in the European Union. They find significant cross-country dispersion in prices that is centered around zero, and
the extent of the dispersion is negatively related to the tradeability of the good. In contrast, Cavallo et al. (2012)
find that online retail prices of a large number of identical goods sold in the Euro zone display no dispersion across
countries.
5Relatedly, Burstein and Jaimovich (2008) argue that even if countries are ex-ante symmetric, a border effect can
result from region-specific shocks that are more correlated within countries than across countries. For example RERs
are more volatile across regions between countries than within countries because NERs are (by construction) less
correlated between countries than within countries.
6The fact that there is large variation across retailers in pricing of the exact same good is consistent with the
evidence in Boivin et al. (2012) who compare prices of books from online stores in Canada and U.S. They also
conclude that international markets are segmented.
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Engel (1993) and Engel (1999) propose an approach to decompose movements in CPI-based
RER into two components: movements in the relative price of tradeable goods across countries,
and movements in the price of non-tradeable relative to tradeable goods across countries. A stan-
dard procedure is to identify non-tradeables with services in the CPI and tradeables with goods
in the CPI.7 While these are aggregate categories, the degree of tradeability varies significantly
across individual products. Based on this disaggregation, changes in the CPI-based RER can be
decomposed as:
∆rercpiin,t = ∆rer
tr
in,t + ∆rer
ntr
in,t, (2)
where
∆rertrin,t = ∆ein,t + ∆cpi
tr
i,t −∆cpitrn,t
∆rerntrin,t = ∆cpii,t −∆cpitri,t −∆cpin,t + ∆cpitrn,t.
Here, ∆cpitrn,t denotes the log changes in the component of the CPI in country n that is categorized
as tradeable. The term ∆cpin,t − ∆cpitrn,t is proportional to the change in the price index of
nontradeable relative to tradeable categories in country n. Hence, equation (2) serves to quantify
the importance of movements in the relative price of nontradeables to tradeables across countries
in accounting for movements in the RER. It is important to note that this decomposition does
not provide a causal interpretation or a structural account of the sources of fluctuations in RERs.
Moreover, the two terms in equation (2) are typically not independent, so one can only calculate
upper and lower bounds on the importance of each component by attributing the covariance term
to one or the other component.
To implement this decomposition one must take a stand on how to measure the price index
for tradable goods. The baseline approach in Engel (1993) and Engel (1999) is to measure the
price index for tradeable goods from the CPI, that is based on retail prices. Alternatively, Engel
(1999) and Betts and Kehoe (2006) measure changes in the price of tradeable goods using producer
price indices (PPI) for manufactured goods or other output price indices. PPIs for manufactured
goods differ from CPIs for tradeable goods in three major ways. First, PPIs include investment and
intermediate goods, as well as consumption goods. Second, PPIs are constructed using changes in
producer and wholesale prices, which on average contain a smaller local distribution margin than
retail prices used in the CPI. Third, PPIs tend to exclude changes in prices for imported goods and
in some countries include changes in prices for exported goods.
Burstein et al. (2005) and Burstein et al. (2006) measure the price index of tradeable goods using
import price indices (IPI). IPIs tend to be constructed using changes in prices of imported goods at
7Non-tradeables categories include education, health, housing, among others. Tradeable categories include non-
durables like food and beverages, apparel, and durables like private transportation, household furnishings, among
others.
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the dock (henceforth denominated border prices) and hence include a smaller component of local
distribution margin in comparison to wholesale and consumer prices. There is large variation across
countries in the procedures used to construct these indices, so one must be cautious in interpreting
cross-country differences in statistics based on IPIs.8 In the absence of data on IPIs for certain
countries researchers use unit values constructed as the ratio of trade values to trade volumes.
Unit values are more likely to be affected by changes in the composition of imports across goods
of different price and quality than indices based on actual prices.
Figure 1, Panel B, plots cumulative log changes in the overall CPI-based RER and in the CPI-
based tradeable RER for the US (trade-weighted), while Panel C adds the other two measures of
tradeable RERs: the PPI-based RER using PPIs for manufactured goods and the IPI-based RER
using IPIs for manufactured goods (the non-oil IPI in the US). Table 3 lists for eight countries in
the period 1975− 2011 (depending on data availability) relative standard deviations, correlations,
and lower and upper bounds of a variance decomposition of quarterly and annual changes in each
of the three measures of tradeable RER relative to the overall CPI-based RER.
The central patterns that emerge can be summarized as follows. First, there appears to be
little difference in the magnitude of fluctuations in the CPI-based RER for tradeable goods and
in the magnitude of fluctuations in the overall CPI-based RER — the relative standard deviation
and correlation between these two series is close to 1 in most countries. From expression (2), this
implies that movements in the relative price of nontradeable to tradeable goods measured using
consumer prices are not an important source of cyclical RER fluctuations (less than 3% in the
U.S.). While we focus on quarterly fluctuations, Engel (1999) shows that this observation holds
both at short and medium term horizons. Second, tradeable RERs computed using PPIs are on
average only slightly less volatile (and less correlated) than CPI-based RERs for tradeable goods.
Third, movements in tradeable RERs computed using IPIs tend to be smaller (especially in U.S.,
Japan, and U.K.) than the other two measures. In the U.S., in the period 1985−2011 the IPI-based
RER is roughly half as volatile as the overall CPI-based RERs, the correlation is roughly 0.5, and
the upper bound of its importance in the variance decomposition is 30%.
Taken together, these observations show that a large fraction of RER fluctuations can be ac-
counted for by movements in the relative price of tradeable goods across countries, but the extent
of cyclical movements in the relative price of tradeable to nontradeable goods depends on the price
measure for tradeable goods – movements in the RER for tradeable goods tend to be smaller and
movements in the relative price of tradeable to nontradeable goods tend to be larger, when tradeable
price indices are constructed using border prices than when constructed using consumer prices.
The observation that movements in consumer and wholesale price-based RERs for tradeable
8For example, Statistics Canada proxies import prices for some goods using prices from foreign sources (see the
section on International Trade Price Indexes).
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goods are large and highly correlated with movements in NERs has also been established using goods
level data (see e.g. Crucini and Telmer (2012), Gopinath et al. (2011), and Broda and Weinstein
(2008)). Crucini and Landry (2012) show that goods with a smaller non-tradeable distribution
component exhibit smaller movements in RERs. This is consistent with the observation that
tradeable RERs are less volatile using import prices (that contain a small non-tradeable component)
than using consumer prices (that contain a larger non-tradeable component).
The fact that relative prices at the consumer level co-move more closely with the NER and are
more volatile than when using border relative prices is consistent with the next empirical finding
on exchange rate pass-through.
Empirical Finding 3 ERPT into consumer prices is lower than into border prices. ERPT into
border prices is typically incomplete in the long-run, displays dynamics and varies considerably
across countries.
Pass-through regressions estimate the sensitivity of prices in a given location to exchange rates,
controlling for other variables relevant for pricing. Several studies estimate dynamic lag regressions
of the kind:
∆pin,t = αin +
T∑
k=0
βin,k∆ein,t−k + γinXin,t + εin,t (3)
where ∆pin,t represents either log changes in prices, price indices, or log changes in unit values for
goods imported in country n from country i, expressed in country n’s currency. k > 0 allows for
lags in the pass-through of exchange rates into prices and t refers to months/quarters/years. Xin,t
represents a vector of controls (including lags), besides the nominal exchange rate and typically
includes a measure of the cost of production in country i, such as wages or producer prices.9
βin,0 measures short-run pass-through (SRPT) and long run pass-through (LRPT) is estimated as∑T
k=0 βk where T is typically set at 2 years.
In Table 4 we report estimates from a quarterly regression of the log import price index (in
domestic currency) on lags 0 to 8 of the log trade-weighted nominal exchange rate (in units of do-
mestic per foreign currency) and lags 0 to 8 of log trade-weighted foreign PPI (in foreign currency).
The contemporaneous pass-through is given by the lag-0 coefficient on the NER, while the long-run
pass-through is given by the sum of the 9 coefficients on lags of the NER.
As is evident the pass-through into consumer prices is uniformly low and well below pass-through
into border prices for each country. For the U.S. both SRPT and LRPT are at least twice as high
into border prices as it is into retail prices. A similar finding is documented for other countries.
There is also large variation in ERPT into border prices across countries with countries like Japan,
Canada, Britain, France and Germany having high LRPT while the U.S., Italy and Switzerland
9In certain cases a measure of prices of competitors in country n, such as producer prices in country n and controls
for local demand conditions such as local GDP are also included.
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have low LRPT. The estimates of ERPT for border prices update the findings in Campa and
Goldberg (2005) who provide cross-sectional and time-series estimates of ERPT for import prices.
We reiterate that unlike consumer prices, import price indices are constructed differently across
countries. The large variation in ERPT estimates can also be attributed to the differing composition
of import bundles since ERPT estimates differ a great deal across goods.
In the case when IPIs, NERs, and producer prices are co-integrated, dynamic lag regressions (3)
are misspecified. To allow for cointegration a vector error correction model (VECM) is estimated.
∆yt = A (Byt−1 + α) +
n∑
k=0
∆yt−k + δ + t (4)
where y is a three-dimensional VECM in the log import price index, the log NER and the log
foreign PPI and B is the vector of coefficients in the co-integrating relationship.10 If the data
points towards a cointegration rank of 1, the VECM is estimated by maximum likelihood. The
long-run exchange rate pass-through is given by (negative) the coefficient on the exchange rate in
the estimated cointegrating vector (the coefficient on import prices is normalized to 1). For four
(Japan, Italy, Canada and Switzerland) of the 8 countries we cannot reject the null that the log
import price index, the log of the NER and the log of foreign PPI are not cointegrated, that is for
these countries the dynamic lag regression provides consistent estimates. When the log tradeable
CPI is used in place of the log IPI the number of countries for which the null cannot be rejected
increases to five (the previous four plus France). In general we find that the standard errors are
quite large and the estimates are highly unstable in the VECM specification depending on the
sample period chosen. Accordingly we decided not to report any numbers.
Large devaluation episodes: The ranking in ERPT across consumer and border prices is also
evident in the episodes of large exchange rate devaluations. These episodes provide a particularly
useful lens to study the impact of changes in exchange rates on prices.11 Burstein et al. (2005)
use basic accounting to provide a breakdown of the impact of large devaluations on border and
consumer prices. Table 5 summarizes the results, reporting changes in aggregate prices for the
large devaluations in Argentina 2001, Brazil 1998, Korea 1997, Mexico 1994, Thailand 1997, the
European devaluations in Finland, Italy, Sweden, and UK in 1992, and the recent large depreciation
of the Icelandic Krona between 2007 and 2009. Burstein et al. (2005) also present some evidence
on prices for Indonesia 1997, Malaysia 1997, Philippines 1997, and Uruguay 2002.
10The lag length n is determined by the Akaike information criteria and the cointegration rank is estimated by the
Johansen trace statistic using a significance level of 95%. Standard errors are based on the usual asymptotic normal
approximation.
11Unlike episodes of regular sized exchange rate movements, large devaluations tend to be associated with large
declines in output, consumption and imports. Those factors inducing contractions in economic activity before or
after large devaluations can play an important role in shaping the small observed increase in wages and prices of
nontradeable goods, as discussed in e.g. Burstein et al. (2007) and Kehoe and Ruhl (2009). For a survey of the
literature on currency and financial crises we refer the reader to the chapter by Guido Lorenzoni in this handbook.
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The central patterns of prices in the aftermath of these devaluation episodes can be summarized
as follows. The increase in prices of nontradeable goods and services tends to be low relative to the
large exchange rate depreciation. The increase in prices of tradable goods is higher, with the extent
of the increase depending critically on whether prices are measured at the retail level (CPI) or at
the border (IPI). In particular, the rise in prices of imports at the dock is significantly higher than
the increase of tradeable consumer prices. In Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, ERPT for the IPI in
the first year is close to complete. In the European devaluations of 1992, ERPT for import prices
is lower than in the other countries, but significantly higher than ERPT for consumer prices of
tradeable goods. Note that, consistent with the importance of distribution costs, consumer prices
of imported goods in Argentina rise by far less than import prices at the dock (130% compared to
204% in the first year after the 244% NER devaluation).
Based on the RER decomposition in expression (2), Burstein et al. (2005) show that for all
devaluation episodes, movements in tradeable RERs are much larger measured using consumer
prices than measured using import prices. In many episodes, movements across countries in the price
of non-tradeable goods relative to border prices of tradeable goods comprise the most important
source of RER movements.
Empirical Finding 4 Border prices, in whatever currency they are set in, respond partially to
exchange rate shocks at most empirically estimated horizons.
Incompleteness in ERPT can arise because prices are completely rigid for a period of time in
the local currency and/or because when prices change they respond only partially to exchange rate
changes. Aggregate pass-through regressions of the kind described above are a combination of the
two phenomenon. Gopinath and Rigobon (2008) and Gopinath et al. (2010) use the micro price
data underlying the construction of U.S. import and export price indices to document the extent
of price rigidity and pass-through conditional on price change of actual traded goods.12 Fitzgerald
and Haller (2012) provide evidence using data for Irish producers. We describe below the findings
on the frequency of price adjustment in the invoicing currency and pass-through conditional on a
price change.13
Frequency: Gopinath and Rigobon (2008) document that the weighted median duration of border
prices in their currency of pricing is 11 months for U.S. imports and 13 months for U.S. exports.
Fitzgerald and Haller (2012) find that for Irish exporters the weighted mean duration is 6.2 months.
The higher degree of stickiness in border prices in comparison to consumer prices is consistent
with evidence on prices in the PPI as documented in Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) for the U.S.
12These findings are further explored in Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010b) and Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010a).
13Given limited data availability of actual traded goods prices there is limited country coverage for the facts on
frequency and conditional pass-through.
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and Gautier et al. (2007) for 6 European countries.14 Eichenbaum et al. (2009) estimate reference
price durations for wholesale prices from a retail chain that are similar to that found from border
prices for comparable categories of goods.15
Conditional on price change: A “Medium-run pass-through” (MRPT) regression takes the
form
∆pin,t = αin + β∆cein,t + γXin,t + εin,t.
∆pin,t is the the change in the log price (in local currency) of the good imported in country n from
country i, where the sample is restricted to those observations that have a non-zero price change
in their currency of pricing. ∆cein,t is the cumulative change in the bilateral nominal exchange
rate over the duration for which the previous price was in effect. Xin,t are controls that include
the cumulative change in the foreign consumer/producer price level. Gopinath et al. (2010) also
provide estimates of “life-long pass-through” (LLPT) that involves cumulating price changes and
exchange rate changes over the entire life of the good in the sample. We report in Table 6 estimates
from medium-run and life-long pass-through regressions for U.S. import prices by country of origin
of goods. These numbers update the results in Gopinath et al. (2010) and Gopinath and Rigobon
(2008) to cover the period 1994-2009. Overall, MRPT is 20% and LLPT is 28%.
Conditional on changing, prices in their currency of pricing respond only partially to exchange
rate shocks. This is why MRPT of dollar priced goods is low at 16% while that of non-dollar
priced goods is high at 80%. Further there are dynamics in pass-through estimates with life-long
pass-through significantly exceeding MRPT for dollar priced goods.16
As one would expect ERPT in the short-run is higher for goods with a higher frequency of price
change, but Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010a) document that this correlation is evident even for the
longer-run based on LLPT estimates.
Finding 4 offers one potential explanation for Finding 3 regarding the large dispersion in esti-
mates of border ERPT across countries. In a pure accounting sense the observation that ERPT to
border prices for developing countries is high is consistent with the fact that the vast majority of
imports into these countries is priced in foreign currencies. Similarly ERPT into import prices for
14One has to be cautious in comparing measures of price stickiness across producer/border goods and consumer
goods. First, the coverage of goods is very different with the former including intermediate and capital goods that
are not included in the CPI bundle. Second, producer/border prices include many business-to-business transactions
and contracts that may incorporate non-price features, while goods consumer prices cover mostly list (spot) prices.
Friberg and Wilander (2008) use survey data for Swedish exporters and find that even for exporters that list a price
the median price adjustment is once per year.
15Gagnon (2009), Gagnon et al. (2012a) and Alvarez et al. (2011) document the state contingent behavior of pricing
with sharp increases in the frequency of price adjustment of consumer prices during episodes of high inflation and
large devaluations.
16The average size of price adjustment conditional on a change is large, consistent with the importance of idiosyn-
cratic factors in pricing. Gopinath and Rigobon (2008) document that the weighted median absolute size of price
change is 8.2% for U.S. imports and 7.9% for U.S. exports.
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the U.S. is one of the lowest across countries because 92% of U.S. imports are priced in dollars.17
Empirical Finding 5 There are large deviations from relative PPP for traded goods produced
in a common location and sold in multiple locations. On average, these deviations co-move with
exchange rates across locations.
Findings 1 and 2 summarized the evidence on deviations from relative PPP across countries
(i.e. movements in product-level RERs) for tradeable goods, without distinguishing whether goods
are produced in a common location or not. Finding 5 summarizes the evidence on deviations
from relative PPP for actual traded goods that are produced in one location and sold in multiple
locations. Under the assumption that changes in marginal costs for individual goods produced in
a common location are independent of the destination to which the good is shipped this evidence
can be used to quantify the extent of the practice of pricing-to-market by exporters through which
they vary markups systematically across destinations. This evidence is mostly based on producer
and wholesale prices, which in principle contain a smaller local cost component than retail prices.
To quantify deviations from relative PPP for traded goods, researchers have used price data
that differs in the degree of disaggregation. Consider first the use of aggregate price data (see e.g.
Atkeson and Burstein (2008) and Drozd and Nosal (2012b)). Applied to aggregate price data, the
hypothesis of relative PPP implies that import prices that consumers in one country pay for another
country’s goods should move one-for-one with the producer prices for goods in those countries that
are the sources of those imports, when all of these prices are expressed in a common currency.
Likewise, a country’s export prices should move one-for-one with that country’s producer prices.
Relative PPP thus implies that the terms of trade (the ratio of export and import at-the-dock
prices for a country relative to its trading partners) should be as volatile as the PPI-based RER,
as can be seen in the following accounting identity:
∆rerppiin,t = (∆ipiin,t −∆epini,t) + (∆ppii,t + ∆ein,t −∆ipiin,t) + (∆epini,t −∆ppint) , (5)
Here, ∆epiin,t denotes the log change in the export price index (EPI) for goods produced in country
i and sold in country n measured in country i’s currency, ∆ipiin,t = ∆epiin,t + ∆ein,t denotes the
import price index (IPI) in country n for goods imported from country i, and (∆ipiin,t −∆epini,t)
denotes the bilateral terms of trade between these two countries. Relative PPP applied to aggregate
price data implies that the second term and third terms should be zero, so that the bilateral terms
17An argument in favor of using micro price data as opposed to aggregate price indices is that one can condition
on an observable price change. As pointed out in Gopinath et al. (2010) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2011) in the
BLS import/export series for the U.S. there are several goods that exit the BLS sample without a single price change,
either because of product substitution or resampling or lack of reporting and consequently estimates of long-run
pass-through using aggregate indices will be biased. Nakamura and Steinsson (2011) provide a bias correction factor
for such index based numbers under certain assumptions and claim that it is large. Gagnon et al. (2012b) under
alternative assumptions claim that the correction factor is small.
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of trade moves one-to-one with the bilateral PPI-based RER. Averaging over country i’s trade
partners, expression (5) implies that the overall terms of trade for this country should move one to
one with its trade-weighted PPI-based RER.
Data on international relative price fluctuations for major industrialized countries reveal that
the terms of trade for manufactured goods are substantially less volatile than the corresponding
PPI-based RER for manufactured goods, as can be see in Panel D of Figure 1 for the U.S., and
Table 7 for our set of industrialized countries. In the U.S., the standard deviation of annual changes
in the manufacturing terms of trade is half as large as that of the manufacturing PPI-based RER.
This observation arises because, at the aggregate level, changes in export and import price indices
deviate systematically from changes in source country producer prices. In particular, an increase
in home producer prices relative to foreign producer prices is typically associated with an increase
in home producer prices relative to export prices, and an increase in home import prices relative
to foreign producer prices. In other words, all three components in the identity (5) tend to be
positively correlated, as shown in Table 7.
Figure 2 illustrates these aggregate deviations from relative PPP using U.S. manufacturing
import price data by source country. Between the years 2006 and 2008, the appreciation of the
Euro against the U.S. dollar resulted in an increase of Germany’s manufacturing PPI measured in
U.S. dollars (∆ppii,t+∆ein,t) of more than 0.3 log points. Import prices in the U.S. for manufactured
goods from Germany (∆ipiin,t) rose by less than 0.1 log points. The extent of aggregate deviations
from relative PPP displayed in Figure 2 varies by source country.
Other studies use data on unit values (ratios of export or import values to export or import
volumes evaluated at border prices) at the level of goods categories or industries to quantify the
extent of deviations from relative PPP, see e.g. the survey in Goldberg and Knetter (1997). The
typical regression is of the form
∆pin,t = λt + θn + βn∆ein,t + εin,t ,
where ∆pin,t is the log change in the export unit value of a good produced in country i and sold in
destination n. If changes in unit values (measured in country i’s currency) are uncorrelated with
changes in the nominal exchange rate across destination countries, then β = 0. The typical finding
in the literature, as surveyed in Goldberg and Knetter (1997), is that β is significantly negative,
meaning that an appreciation of the Euro (country i) against the U.S. dollar (country n), ∆ein,t > 0,
results in a decline in the export price of a German firm in the U.S. relative to the price in other
destinations. There is substantial variation in β across industries and across exporting countries.
Knetter (1989) and Knetter (1993) use this type of regression to show that pricing-to-market by
U.S. exporters is less prevalent than pricing-to-market by exporters from other major industrialized
countries.
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In order to infer deviations from relative PPP for individual goods from aggregate price indices
or unit values, one has to worry that movements in international relative aggregate prices can result
from differences in the product and quality composition of the indices, and not from changes in
relative price across locations for common goods. To address this concern, recent work measure
deviations from relative PPP using relative price movements for individual products sold in multiple
locations.
Burstein and Jaimovich (2008) and Fitzgerald and Haller (2012) focus on products produced
in a common location and sold in multiple destinations to identify the extent of pricing-to-market.
Fitzgerald and Haller (2012) use domestic and export prices at the plant level from Ireland’s
PPI monthly survey. Burstein and Jaimovich (2008) use wholesale prices of individual products
produced in a common location and purchased by a large retailer in Canada and the U.S. Both
papers find that, on average, export prices relative to domestic prices (measured in the same
currency) follow closely movements in the bilateral exchange rate.
In Fitzgerald and Haller (2012), a 10% appreciation of the Pound Sterling against the Euro
results in a roughly 10% increase in the price charged by Irish exporters in the U.K. relative to
the domestic price. In Burstein and Jaimovich (2008), a 10% appreciation of the Canadian dollar
against the US dollar results in a roughly 8% increase in prices charged by exporters in Canada
relative to the price charged in the US. Both papers find that these large movements in relative
prices are also observed conditional on nominal price adjustment. Burstein and Jaimovich (2008)
show that, while on average movements in product-level RERs for traded goods produced in a
common location track changes in nominal exchange rates, there are large idiosyncratic movements
in product-level RERs: movements in international product-level RERs are three to four times as
large as movements in the Canada-US nominal exchange rate.
3 A simple framework to interpret empirical findings
The facts in the empirical section provide a model-free description of the data. However, under-
standing what might be generating these facts and their implications for how firms price requires
the use of models. In this section we use a simple model to interpret the evidence. This model, as
well as those presented in sections 4-6 are in partial equilibrium in that wages and exchange rates
are taken as given. The general equilibrium model in section 7 endogenizes wages and exchange
rates.
Let pin represents the log border price and p
r
in the log retail (consumer) price of a good exported
from country i (Germany) to country n (U.S.), where all prices are expressed in the buyer’s local
currency (dollars). To sell the good, a retailer combines the physical good with local distribution
services according to some constant returns to scale technology, and then adds a markup. For sim-
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plicity, we lump together wholesale and retail costs and markups. Up to a first-order approximation,
the log change in the consumer price, ∆prin, is given by
∆prin =
(
1− sdin
)
∆pin + s
d
in∆p
d
n + ∆µ
r
in, (6)
where ∆pdn denotes the log change in the price of distribution services in country n, ∆µ
r
in denotes
the log change in the gross retail markup, and sdin denotes the share of distribution costs in the
pre-markup retail price, sdin = 1− exp (pin + µrin − prin).
A number of papers have measured the “distribution wedge”as the difference between producer
and retail prices as a fraction of retail prices, 1− exp (pin − prin), or similarly, the sum of wholesale
and retail gross margins relative to retail sales.18 In our specification, the distribution wedge is
equal to sdin +
(
1− sdin
)
(exp (µrin)− 1) / exp (µrin), and hence combines distribution costs and retail
markups. Burstein et al. (2003) and Campa and Goldberg (2010) calculate the distribution wedge
for consumer goods in the U.S. and other OECD countries using Input-Output tables, while Berger
et al. (2009) use matched micro price data in the U.S. This distribution wedge is found to be large
ranging between 40% and 70% across tradeable goods (i.e. not including services) and is quite
stable over time.
Aggregating changes in consumer prices across all tradeables goods consumed in country n
(domestically produced and imported) in two consecutive time periods, we obtain the log change
in the tradeables CPI:
∆cpitrn =
(
1− sdn
)
(1− smn ) ∆ppinn +
(
1− sdn
)
smn ∆ipin + s
d
n∆p
d
n + ∆µ
r
n, (7)
where smn denotes the share of expenditures (exclusive of distribution costs) on imported goods in
country n, sdn denotes the aggregate share of distribution costs in country n, ∆ipin is a weighted
average of import border prices, ∆ppinn denotes the log change in the producer price index in
country n including only goods sold domestically (we do not use ppin for this since the PPI in some
countries include prices of exported goods), and ∆µrn denotes the average change in retail markups
in country n. The change in the CPI-based RER for tradeables goods for two ex-ante symmetric
countries, country 1 and country 2, can be expressed as:
∆rertr12 =
(
1− sd
)
(1− 2sm) (∆ppi11 + ∆e12 −∆ppi22) (8)
+sd
(
∆pd1 + ∆e12 −∆pd2
)
+ (∆µr1 −∆µr2)
+
(
1− sd
)
sm (∆epi2 −∆ppi22 −∆epi1 + ∆ppi11) .
We can use equations (6), (7) and (8) to interpret Findings 1, 2, 3 and 5. Consider first ERPT
for goods imported in country n from country i. The fact that for imported goods, ERPT for
18The distribution wedge can also be calculated as the gap between total goods consumption at purchaser prices
(from NIPA) and goods production attributed to consumption, at producer prices, as reported in Input-Output
Tables.
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consumer prices is lower than for border prices (Finding 3) can be the result of two forces as seen
from equation (6). First, for a given ERPT into border prices, wholesale and retail markups may
fall in response to an exchange rate shock, ∆µrin/∆ein < 0. Second, the price of local distribution
services, pdn, may respond partially (less than border prices) to exchange rate movements.
While there is ample evidence of high distribution wedges, measures of changes in the price
of local distribution services and measures of changes in retail and wholesale markups are less
readily available. This has led to an active literature quantifying the role of local distribution costs
and variable wholesale and retail markup, using different approaches. Berger et al. (2009) find
that changes in distribution wedges are not correlated with exchange rate changes, which from
our expression above is consistent with constant distribution cost shares sdin and constant markups
µrin. Gopinath et al. (2011) show using Canada-US scanner data from a large retail chain that
changes in retail markups have low correlation with changes in the Canada-US exchange rate.19
Goldberg and Hellerstein (2006) estimate a structural IO model featuring local distribution costs,
variable wholesale and retail markups, and menu costs, using U.S. data on the beer industry. They
show through counterfactuals that, because retail markups do not vary much with exchange rate
changes, local costs must be insensitive to exchange-rate movements and play a significant role in
generating incomplete pass-through to consumer prices.20 Alessandria et al. (2010) consider the
role of inventory management frictions of retailers as an important ingredient of retail distribution
costs. We discuss this model in Section 4.
To sum up, lower ERPT for consumer prices than for border prices of imported goods can be
mechanically explained by the presence of significant local costs that are insensitive to exchange-
rate movements. There is less support for the role of variable retail mark-ups in inducing low ERPT
for consumer prices. Given this conclusion, for the remainder of the chapter we assume that retail
markups are constant, ∆µrin = 0.
Finding 3 that ERPT is low for consumer prices of tradeable goods (which include domestic and
imported goods) can be understood using (7). If tradeable consumption includes a large portion of
domestically produced goods and services (stemming from a combination of sm < 0.5 and s
d > 0)
and prices of domestically produced goods and services are not very sensitive to exchange rates,
then ERPT for the tradeable CPI is low even if ERPT at the border is high. The high share of
domestically produced goods in the tradeable CPI can also explain, using equation (8), Finding
2 that movements in the CPI-based RER for tradeable goods are almost as large as the relative
price of domestically produced goods (the PPI-based RER) and also as large as movements in the
overall CPI-based RER (which combines the CPI-based RER for tradeable goods and non-tradeable
19Eichenbaum et al. (2009) also find, using the same data, that on average retail markups are quite insensitive over
time exclusive of temporary sales.
20Nakamura and Zerom (2010) considers a similar exercise for the case of the coffee market in the U.S. in response
to changes in the world price of coffee grain and find rapid pass-through of changes in producer prices to consumer
prices.
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services)2122. Moreover, based on Finding 5, firms price-to-market. In response to an exchange rate
depreciation in country 1, relative prices for traded goods tend to increase in country 2 relative to
country 1: ∆ppi2 > ∆epi2 and ∆epi1 > ∆ppi1 – both of which imply that the terms of trade move
less than the PPI-based RER. Deviations from relative PPP for traded goods, the fourth term in
the expression on the RHS of equation (8), therefore contribute to larger movements in rertr12. In
sum, the evidence points to all but the third term on the right hand side of the equality in equation
(8) co-moving with the exchange rate and contributing to explain Findings 2 that the CPI-based
RER for tradeable goods is roughly as volatile as the RER for domestically produced goods. Given
the evidence on large home bias and important distribution shares the volatility of rertr12 appears
to be driven mainly by the first two terms, with the fourth term playing a smaller role.
Finding 2 that for many countries the RER for tradeable goods constructed using import price
indices move less closely with nominal exchange rates than the RER for tradeables constructed
using consumer price indices can be understood by the higher share of distribution costs and local
goods in the CPI than in the IPI.23
Throughout this discussion, we have taken as given the fact that prices of domestically produced
goods and services are not very sensitive to NERs. If the share of these domestically produced
goods and services in the CPI is high, then Finding 1 that movements in the overall CPI-based
RER co-move closely with nominal exchange rates follows. This begs the question, why are prices
of domestically produced goods and services so insensitive to NERs nominal exchange rate. We
discuss this further in the general equilibrium section 7.
We now consider the pricing of goods at the border (at-the-dock). We first consider an environ-
ment with flexible prices and then allow for nominal rigidities in pricing. We use the model with
nominal rigidities to interpret Finding 4.
3.1 Flexible prices
Suppose that firms face segmented markets in each country so that they can charge a different
price by destination. The optimal flexible log border price can be expressed as the sum of the log
21Burstein et al. (2005) and Fitzgerald (2008) perform accounting exercises of this form to explain the link between
exchange rates and CPI and CPI-based RER for a number of countries, using measures of trade shares in consumption.
Hau (2002) shows that more open economies tend to display less volatile RERs.
22Here we are abstracting from changes in the relative price between domestically produced tradeable goods and
domestically produced services. These are potentially important to understand lower frequency trends in relative
prices (see e.g. Asea and Mendoza (1994)) and movements in RERs in certain episodes such as exchange-rate based
stabilizations (see e.g. Rebelo and Vegh (1995)).
23Note that if countries import different sets of commodities, we should not expect the RER constructed using IPIs
to be constant over time even if relative PPP holds for each commodity (in a two-country world, for example, the
IPI-based RER is equal to the terms of trade). Similarly, even if relative PPP holds for each commodity, we should
not expect the RER constructed using PPIs to be constant over time if countries specialize in the production of a
different set of commodities. In contrast, in the absence of home bias in consumption and if relative PPP holds for
each good, it follows from equation (8) that the RER constructed using tradeable CPIs should be constant over time
because the set of tradeable goods consumed in each country is identical.
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marginal cost and gross markup:
pin = µin +mcin. (9)
We assume that the mark-up depends on the price charged by the exporting (German) firm rel-
ative to the (log) aggregate industry price level in the destination country n (U.S.), pn. That is,
µin = µin(pin − pn). We describe in section 4 a number of models that produce this reduced-form
relationship between markups and relative price, where the exact specification of µin (.) as well
as the definition of the relevant aggregate industry price index pn depends on model. The dollar
marginal cost is given by mcin = mcin(qin, wi, ein), where qin is the quantity sold by the German
firm in the U.S. markets and wi summarizes those variables that impact the costs of production
incurred by the German firm that are local to Germany such as German wages in euros and total
factor productivity.
Log-differentiating (9), we have that the log change in price, ∆pin, can be approximated as
∆pin = −Γin (∆pin −∆pn) +mcq∆qin + ∆wi + αin∆ein ,
where Γin ≡ − ∂µin(.)∂(pin−pn) is the elasticity of the mark-up with respect to the relative price, mcq ≡
∂mcin(.,.,.)
∂q is the elasticity of marginal cost with respect to output (which we assume is common
across firms), and αin ≡ ∂mcin(.,.,.)∂ein is the partial-elasticity of the marginal cost (expressed in the
destination country’s currency) to the exchange rate. Note that we have assumed, without loss of
generality, that ∂mcin(.,.,.)∂wi = 1. In the case of constant mark-ups, Γin = 0. When the production
technology is constant returns to scale then mcq = 0, with decreasing returns to scale mcq > 0.
When all production costs for a German firm are in euros αin = 1.
Log demand is given by qin = q (pin − pn) + qn where qn denotes the log of aggregate quanti-
ties/demand in country n. Log-differentiating,
∆qin = −εin (∆pin −∆pn) + ∆qn
where εin ≡ −∂q(.)∂pin > 0 is the price elasticity of demand. Combining these two equations and
collecting terms we obtain:
∆pin =
1
1 + Γin + Φin
[∆wi + αin∆ein + (Γin + Φin) ∆pn +mcq∆qn] (10)
where Φin = mcqεin ≥ 0 is the partial elasticity of marginal cost with respect to the relative price.
Consider a change in the bilateral exchange rate, ∆ein, assuming for now that ∆wi = 0. The
resulting change in the price charged by firm i in country n implied by expression (10) can be
decomposed into a direct effect at fixed aggregate prices and quantities in country n (i.e. ∆pn =
∆qn = 0), and an indirect effect induced by changes in aggregate prices and quantities in country
n . The direct effect can be thought of as the overall effect when country i is very small relative to
country n in that changes in the bilateral exchange rate do not affect aggregate outcomes in country
n. The following proposition characterizes the direct component of exchange-rate pass-through.
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Proposition 1 Exchange rate pass-through, when ∆wi = ∆pn = ∆qn = 0, is given by
∆pin
∆ein
=
αin
1 + Γin + Φin
.
If Γin = 0, Φin = 0, and αin = 1, then ERPT is 1.
Intuitively, when the dollar depreciates relative to the euro this raises the dollar marginal
costs of the German firm, all else equal. The sensitivity of dollar marginal costs to the exchange
rate movement depends on αin. Suppose the German firm sources some of its production inputs
globally and these inputs are priced in dollars, whose dollar price is unaffected by the exchange-rate
movement. In this case, only a fraction of the firm’s marginal cost is affected, so αin < 1 and ERPT
is less than 1. In response to the rise in dollar marginal cost, the firm considers raising the dollar
export price. The increase in the profit-maximizing price depends on two factors.
The first factor is the degree to which marginal costs increase in the firm’s scale of production.
If mcq > 0, as the firm raises its prices the quantity sold declines, this reduces the marginal cost of
the firm and dampens the initial desire to raise prices. The extent to which this happens depends
not only on the extent of decreasing returns to scale, but also on the elasticity of demand the
firm faces εin, since that determines the magnitude of the quantity response. A higher value of
Φin = mcqεin works to reduce ERPT below 1.
The second factor determining ERPT is the degree to which desired markups depend on a
firm’s price relative to the aggregate price. Suppose that desired markups are decreasing in the
relative price set by the firm, Γin > 0. As the price of the German firm relative to the aggregate
industry price in the U.S. increases, that reduces its desired mark-up, another reason to dampen
price increase and reduce pass-through.
Proposition 1 displays the direct effect on German prices in the U.S. resulting from a change
in the Euro/dollar exchange rate when aggregate industry prices and quantities in the U.S. remain
unchanged to this exchange rate movement (i.e. ∆pn = ∆qn = 0). In practice, however, changes
in the Euro/dollar bilateral exchange rate may be associated with changes in U.S. aggregate prices
and quantities, which give rise to additional indirect effects from exchange rate changes on German
prices in the U.S. At this point we do not discuss what generates this association and take it as
given.
Proposition 2 ERPT including both direct and indirect effects, when ∆wi = 0, is given by
∆pin
∆ein
=
αin
1 + Γin + Φin
+
Γin + Φin
1 + Γin + Φin
∆pn
∆ein
+
mcq
1 + Γin + Φin
∆qn
∆ein
.
The indirect effects of changes in aggregate prices and quantities in country n on country i’s
prices charged in country n can be understood as follows. An increase in the U.S. aggregate
industry price, ∆pn > 0, increases the price charged by German firms if Γin + Φin > 0. Intuitively,
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an increase in the U.S. aggregate price increases the German firm’s desired markup (when Γin > 0)
and increases quantity sold and marginal cost (when Φin > 0), both of which result in a higher
price. Moreover, an increase in U.S. aggregate quantities, ∆qn > 0, increases the German firm’s
demand and marginal cost (when mcq > 0), resulting in an increase in the German firm’s price.
These results imply that, unless markups are independent of relative prices (Γin = 0) and marginal
costs are independent of quantities (mcq = 0), the overall degree of ERPT depends crucially on the
details of how aggregate prices and quantities respond to exchange rate movements.
Interpretation of results of ERPT regressions: The ERPT regressions reported under the
empirical Finding 3 provide a useful way of summarizing the response of border prices to movements
in exchange rates. Here we discuss to what extent ERPT estimates can be used to shed light
on the underlying forces that shape ERPT in our model. Propositions 1 and 2 point out that
incompleteness of ERPT into border prices can arise either because of the lack of sensitivity of the
exporters cost to the exchange rate shocks, variability of mark-ups or decreasing returns to scale.
ERPT also depends on the specifics of the regression being estimated, whether direct and indirect
effects are considered.
The direct effects reported in Proposition 1 can be viewed as the estimated ERPT assuming
that changes in other components of marginal cost, aggregate quantities and aggregate prices can
be “controlled for” in those regressions. Shocks that affect the exchange rate can simultaneously
induce movements in marginal cost components (such as foreign wages or global commodity prices)
that impact pricing. If these costs are not well measured then the ERPT estimate includes the affect
of these omitted variables on prices.24 The precise definitions of marginal cost and the aggregate
price index depend on model details. For example, in the CES model with a finite number of firms
per sector described below, the price index pn only includes the subset of prices of firms in the
sector that directly compete with firm i. Empirical work trying to estimate the degree of ERPT
typically lacks data on prices of a firm’s direct competitors.25 Using the PPI as a proxy for this
price index may be highly imperfect. Given the difficulties in measuring pn, ERTP regressions may
be effectively estimating the “uncontrolled” degree of ERPT (which include both the direct and
the indirect effects).
The sensitivity of pn to the exchange rate, which determines the indirect effect of ERPT,
depends on important details such as the source of the shock to the exchange rate (which shapes
the response of e.g. costs and prices of domestic producers competing with foreign exporters). It
also depends on whether the exchange rate shock being considered is idiosyncratic to the bilateral
country pair or is a common shock, for instance where the dollar simultaneously depreciates relative
24Corsetti and Leduc (2008) use a GE model to investigate possible biases from omitted variables and measurement
error in ERPT regressions.
25There are exceptions, such as Auer and Schoenle (2012), that construct structural measures of competitors’ price
indices using micro price data.
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to the currencies of all its trading partners. In the latter case the movement in pn will tend to
be larger and the estimated ERPT will be large. Consistent with this implication, Gopinath and
Itskhoki (2010b) document that for the U.S. ERPT for border prices is higher when the trade
weighted NER is used compared to when the bilateral NER is used. Auer and Schoenle (2012) and
Pennings (2012) document a similar finding at the sectoral level using the same micro price data.
Note that αin is also sensitive to the scope of the exchange rate shock. If the shock is common
across countries and the German firm uses inputs from other countries affected by the shock then
αin can be higher.
To re-emphasize, while measures of ERPT provide a simple reduced form way of summarizing
the response of prices to exchange rates, there is no single measure of ERPT that is independent
of model details and driving shocks. One needs to be cautious when comparing estimates across
studies, countries, and time periods and drawing implications for model parameters of pricing
models, without knowledge of details of the environment.
Pricing to market: Next, consider the evidence summarized in Finding 5 on deviations from
relative PPP for individual goods produced in a common location and sold in multiple destinatons.
The change in the relative price of a good produced in country i and sold in countries n and m,
both expressed in the same currency, is given by
(∆pin + ∆eni)− (∆pim + ∆emi) = (∆mcin + ∆eni −∆mcim −∆emi) + (∆µin −∆µim) .
If the change in marginal cost is independent of where the good is sold, then changes in relative
prices across countries are given by (∆µin −∆µim). Note that to obtain pricing to market one
requires not just variable mark-ups but the response of mark-ups should vary across locations.
Therefore, incomplete pass-through arising from variable mark-ups in and of itself is not sufficient
to generate pricing-to-market.
Data on deviations from relative PPP for individual goods without information on the country
of production of individual goods and based on retail prices that have a substantial local cost com-
ponent are not informative enough to separate movements in relative markups from movements in
relative marginal costs across locations. The evidence summarized in Finding 5, based on producer
and wholesale prices for goods produced in a common location for sales in multiple destination,
suggests a substantial role for variable markups in generating deviations from relative PPP.26 The
fact that relative markups move even conditional on price adjustment, as documented in Fitzgerald
and Haller (2012), suggest that movements in markups are not purely driven, mechanically, by
sticky prices in the buyer’s local currency.
What determines how markups for goods produced in a common location change across desti-
26While Burstein and Jaimovich (2008) use wholesale prices, which are not free of local distribution costs, they
report that the average gross margin as a percentage of wholesale sales for groceries and related products in the U.S.
is only 16%.
23
nations in model considered above? To ensure that changes in marginal costs are the same across
destinations, we assume mcq = 0 and αij = 1. The following proposition derives the change in
relative prices (and relative markups) under the assumption that the markup elasticity for this
good is equal in the two destinations.
Proposition 3 If Γin = Γim, then the change in the markup across destinations for a good produced
in country i is given by
∆µin −∆µim = Γin
1 + Γin
[(∆pn + ∆eni)− (∆pm + ∆emi)] . (11)
According to expression 11, the change in the relative markup set by a country i firm in countries
n and m is proportional to the change in the aggregrate (industry-wide) real-exchange rate between
these two countries. In response to a change in marginal cost of production faced by the German
exporter that does not affect the Germany-U.S. industry-wide real exchange rate, relative markups
between Germany and the U.S. are unchanged, even if Γin > 0 (in which case ERPT is incomplete).
On the other hand, if the aggregate industry price level in U.S. rises relative to that in Canada
(both prices measured in a common currency), then a German exporter will increase the markup it
charges in U.S. relative to that in Canada. The relative markup more closely tracks the aggregate
real exchange rate, the higher is the elasticity of markup with respect to the relative price Γin.
More generally, if the markup elasticity Γin varies across destination markets, then the size and
direction of pricing-to-market depends on the specific shape of Γin, which is determined by model
details.
We now consider the environment when prices adjust infrequently consistent with the evidence
surveyed in Finding 4.
3.2 Nominal rigidities in pricing
When prices are sticky the sensitivity of prices to exchange rate changes depends on the currency in
which prices are rigid and pass-through of shocks display dynamics over time. Infrequent price ad-
justments can be modeled in different ways, under the assumption of Calvo pricing (Calvo (1983)),
using menu costs and state contingent pricing or with imperfect information and rational inat-
tention.27 To present some insights we use the Calvo environment that lends itself to analytical
characterizations using first order approximations. Given that this pricing model is dynamic, we
must re-introduce time notation.
Once again consider a German firm i selling in the country n, the U.S. For now let us assume
that firm i prices in currency n, that is it follows local currency pricing and prices in U.S. dollars
27See e.g. Midrigan (2007) for a menu cost model of international relative price fluctuations, and see e.g. Crucini
et al. (2010) for a model with imperfect information.
24
when selling in the U.S. Define the desired (or flexible) price of firm i, p˜in,t, as the logarithm of the
price it would set if it could flexibly adjust its price in every state, that is,
p˜in,t = arg max
pin
Π(pin|st), (12)
where st summarizes the firm’s relevant state at time t. The logarithm of the reset price by a firm
from country i selling in country n is denoted by p¯in,t. The observed price is pin,t = p¯in,t when
prices change and pin,t = pin,t−1 when it does not. The optimal reset price in a Calvo environment
is determined by the first order condition∑∞
`=0 κ
`EtΘt+`Πp
(
p¯in,t|st+l
)
= 0 (13)
where κ is the constant probability of non-adjustment at each date, Πp denotes the partial derivative
of the profit function with respect to p, and Θt+` represents the stochastic discount factor. In
steady-state with zero inflation, Θt+` = β
l, where β < 1 is the discount factor. Log-linearizing
equation (13) around the flexible price first-order condition, as shown in Gopinath et al. (2010),
the optimal reset price can be approximated as:
p¯in,t = (1− βκ)
∞∑
`=0
(βκ)`Etp˜in,t+`. (14)
That is, the reset price p¯in,t can be expressed as a weighted-average of expected desired prices where
the weights depend on the probability of non-adjustment and the discount factor.
We now derive the reset price under the assumptions of section 3.1 and, for expositional sim-
plicity, constant returns to scale in production, mcq = Φ = 0. Starting from equation (9) and
approximating the level of the mark-up and the marginal cost around their steady-state levels, the
desired price is, up to a first order approximation:
p˜in,t+` =
1
1 + Γin
[wi,t+` + αinein,t+` + Γinpn,t+` + constin] , (15)
where constin contains steady state values. Combining (14) and (15), the reset price is, up to a
first order approximation:
p¯in,t =
(1− βκ)
1 + Γin
∞∑
`=0
(βκ)`Et [wi,t+` + αinein,t+` + Γinpn,t+` + constin] . (16)
In the instances when the German firm i does not change its dollar price then clearly ERPT
is 0. When it does adjust, ERPT is determined by the change in the reset price. The following
proposition derives ERPT conditional on price adjustment when the exchange rate follows an AR(1)
process and aggregate prices are constant.
Proposition 4 If the exchange rate follows an AR(1) with persistence parameter 0 ≤ ρe ≤ 1 and
wi,t and pn,t are constant for all t, ERPT for a firm, conditional on changing price (MRPT) equals:
∆pin,t
∆cein,t
=
(1− βκ)
(1− βκρe)
αin
1 + Γin
, (17)
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where we use the same notation as in the empirical section. Expression (17) follows immediately
from equation (16) and the assumption that the NER follows an AR(1) process.28 When ρe = 1,
that is the NER follows a random walk, then ERPT conditional on price change is the same as
that in the static section. With ρe < 1, ERPT is less that 1 even conditional on a price change,
and even if flexible price ERPT is complete (i.e. αin = 1, Γin = Φin = 0). When the NER change
is not expected to last firms choose to adjust only partially since they will be stuck with the new
price for a period of time within which the NER can revert back to its original value.
In the case when pn is impacted by the exchange rate change and Γin is non-zero, ERPT depends
on the response of the aggregate price index pn to the exchange rate change. As long as there is
staggered price adjustment, the aggregate price index will depend on lagged exchange rate shocks
even prior to the last round of price adjustment. This implies that, if Γin is non-zero,
∆pin,t
∆cein,t
will
depend on lagged exchange rates prior to the last round of price adjustment, in contrast to the
result in Proposition 4. There will be dynamics in pass-through with one price adjustment being
insufficient to attain long-run pass-through.29
We now calculate the change in the aggregate price in country n for goods imported from
country i, i.e. the import price index ∆ipiint, assuming that all firms from country i selling in
country n are symmetric except for the timing of price adjustment. Since a random fraction (1−κ)
of firms change prices and they all choose the same price (given symmetry), the change in the
import price index is given by:
∆ipiin,t = (1− κ)(p¯in,t − ipiin,t−1).
Short-run pass-through into the import price index is a combination of the fraction of firms changing
prices and desired pass-through.
In the next sub-section we explore the role of the currency in which prices are set on ERPT.
3.2.1 Currency of pricing and exchange rate pass-through
Most countries import goods that are priced in multiple currencies. Let p¯jin represent the reset price
of imports into country n from country i priced in the currency of country j ∈ (n, i). Suppose a
fraction (1−ϑ) of firms from Germany price in euros (i) and ϑ in dollars (n), and that the frequency
of price adjustment (1− κ) is equal for both groups of firms. Assuming symmetry across all firms
28The proof is as follows: For a good that changes prices at time t and time t− j, ∆pin,t
∆cein,t
=
p¯in,t−p¯in,t−j
ein,t−ein,t−j . Equation
(16) implies
p¯in,t − p¯in,t−j = (1− βκ) αin
1 + Γin
[
Et
∞∑
`=0
(βκ)`ein,t+` − Et−j
∞∑
`=0
(βκ)`ein,t−j+`
]
Using Etein,t+` = ρ`eein,t we obtain the equation in (17).
29Note that when pn changes over time in response to the shock, controlling only for the contemporaneous affect
on pn will not suffice to arrive at the direct component of ERPT, unlike the case of flexible prices. This is because
lags of changes in pn will impact ERPT in addition to the direct effect, derived in proposition 4.
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within a particular currency pricing category, the change in the aggregate import price index (in
dollars) is given by:
∆ipiin,t = (1− κ)
[
ϑ(p¯nin,t − ipinin,t−1) + (1− ϑ)
(
p¯iin,t − ipiiin,t−1 + ∆ein,t
)]
+ κ(1− ϑ)∆ein,t
where ipijin,t denotes the import price index for goods priced in the currency of country j. By
construction, ERPT for firms that do not adjust price is zero for dollar pricing firms and is 1 for
euro pricing firms. The following proposition characterizes short-run ERPT into the import price
index.
Proposition 5 Short run ERPT into the aggregate import price index is given by:
∆ipiin,t
∆ein,t
= (1− ϑ) + (1− κ)
[
ϑ
∆p¯nin,t
∆ein,t
+ (1− ϑ)∆p¯
i
in,t
∆ein,t
]
(18)
assuming symmetry across all firms within a particular currency pricing category.
The first term on the right hand side of equation (18) indicates that the larger the fraction of
goods priced in euros, (1 − ϑ), the higher the short-run pass-through. The second term captures
price changes in the currency of invoicing.
The dollar reset price p¯nin,t is given by equation (14) replacing for notation sake p˜in,t+` with
p˜iin,t+` to represent desired prices in dollars. A similar derivation gives the euro reset price p¯
i
in,t as:
p¯iin,t = (1− βκ)
∞∑
`=0
(βκ)`Etp˜iin,t+`
where p˜iin,t+` is the desired price in euros. In the case when flexible desired prices are the same
regardless of currency of invoicing, that is p˜iin,t+`+ein,t=p˜
n
in,t+`, we obtain the following proposition
linking the two reset prices, as derived in Gopinath et al. (2010):
Proposition 6 If the NER follows a random walk and flexible desired prices are the same across
firms regardless of the currency of pricing, then the reset price and ERPT conditional on changing
price is equal across firms, up to the first order:
p¯nin,t = p¯
i
in,t + ein,t
∆pnin,t
∆cein,t
=
∆piin,t
∆cein,t
+ 1
That is, the law of one price holds for the reset price if the fundamentals are the same. Note that
ERPT conditional on price change is the same across firms including both the direct and indirect
effects as well as any other change in costs.
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We now discuss the findings in the empirical section in the context of the current framework.
In the absence of micro price data pass-through estimates using import price indices typically
combine the effect of sticky prices and pass-through conditional on a price change as discussed
earlier. Proposition 4 discusses the conditions under which pass-through conditional on a price
change (MRPT) as estimated in the empirical section for Finding 4 is a measure of life-long pass-
through (LLPT). It requires ρe = 1 and Γin = 0. In the case when Γin 6= 0, the indirect effects of
ERPT arising from changes in the aggregate price level show up dynamically over time and one
would require multiple rounds of price adjustment to arrive at LLPT. As documented in Gopinath
et al. (2010), the fact that MRPT is lower than LLPT is consistent with an important role for
Γin 6= 0.
The combination of the fact that prices adjust infrequently in the currency in which they are
priced in, and that even conditional on a price change they respond only partially to the NER, as
documented in Finding 4, implies that aggregate pass-through estimates are heavily determined by
the currency composition of the import bundle, in the short and medium run. This is evident from
the expression in proposition 5.
As demonstrated in proposition 6, if firm fundamentals (that is, desired flexible prices) are the
same and the NER follows a random walk, MRPT should be the same conditional on a price change
regardless of the currency in which goods are priced. As documented in Finding 4 this is not the
case in the data. Pass-through of dollar priced imports into the U.S. is significantly lower than for
non-dollar priced imports even conditional on a price change. As demonstrated in Engel (2006) (for
one period ahead price stickiness) and Gopinath et al. (2010) (for Calvo pricing) this is consistent
with a model where firms optimally choose what currency to set their prices in. If prices adjust
every period, currency choice is irrelevant. However when prices are sticky, the firm can choose its
currency to keep its preset price closer to it’s desired price.
We present the argument in a one period ahead sticky price environment as in Engel (2006). A
risk neutral firm chooses to price in the local (n) currency as opposed to the producer (i) currency if
Et−1Π(p¯nin,t) > Et−1(Π(p¯iin,t).30 Taking a second order approximation to the profit function around
the flexible price at date t we have that,
Et−1
[
Π(p¯nin,t)−Π(p¯iin,t)
] ≈ Et−1 1
2
Π˜pp
[
(p¯nin,t − p˜nin,t)2 − (p¯iin,t + ein,t − p˜nin,t)2
]
(19)
where Π˜pp < 0 is the second derivative of the profit function evaluated at the date t − 1 price.
Here we have used the fact that flexible price profits are the same regardless of currency, that
p˜nin,t = p˜
i
in,t + ein,t, and that the first derivative of the profit function equals zero when evaluated
30The result is unchanged if the firm is risk averse as long as the discount factor is exogenous to the decisions of
the firm as pointed out by Engel (2006).
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at the flexible price. Expanding the right hand side of (19) and taking the expectation we have:31
Et−1
[
Π(p¯nin,t)−Π(p¯iin,t)
] ≈ 1
2
Π˜ppCovt−1(−ein,t, ein,t − 2p˜nin,t) (20)
The firm will therefore choose LCP if:
Covt−1(p˜nin,t, ein,t)
V art−1(ein,t)
<
1
2
, (21)
that is if its desired pass-through is low enough. The cut-off of 0.5 follows from the second order
approximation. Intuitively, if a firm desires low exchange rate pass-through in the short run before
it has a chance to adjust prices, the firm is better off choosing local currency pricing that results
in 0% pass-through in the short run. Conversely, if short-run desired pass-through is high, the
firm should choose producer currency pricing that results in complete (100%) pass-through prior
to price adjustment.
A number of papers in the literature fit into this simple framework. Devereux et al. (2004)
consider an environment with one period ahead price stickiness, constant mark-ups and con-
stant returns to scale. They show that an exporter will price in local currency if Covt−1(wi,t +
ein,t, ein,t)/V art−1(ein,t) < 0.5. It follows from equation (15), that if Γ = 0, Φ = 0 and α = 1 then
Covt−1(wi,t + ein,t, ein,t) = Covt−1(p˜nin,t, ein,t). The cut-off rule is the same as (21). Bacchetta and
van Wincoop (2005) assume constant mark-ups (Γ = 0) and decreasing returns to scale (Φ > 0).
They show that all else equal a marginal exporter selling to a country where all local firms price
in the local currency will choose to price in local currency the higher the elasticity of demand it
faces. This again fits into condition (21). To see this, recall that Φ = mcqε, therefore for a given
mcq the higher is the elasticity of demand ε the larger is Φ and the lower is desired pass-through.
In the case of Calvo pricing, as derived in Gopinath et al. (2010), the currency choice rule
depends on the average desired pass-through over the period of non-adjustment. This depends
both on the dynamic path of desired pass-through and the duration of non-adjustment.32 Gopinath
et al. (2010) also show that MRPT, that is pass-through conditional on the first adjustment to the
exchange rate shock, as estimated in the empirical section, is a good measure of this average desired
pass-through.
In terms of empirical evidence linking currency choice to primitives of desired pass-through,
Goldberg and Tille (2008) find evidence in support of the role of strategic complementarities in
31To derive equation (20), the right hand side of (19) can be expressed as:
Et−1
1
2
Π˜pp
[
(p¯nin,t − p¯iin,t − ein,t)(p¯nin,t + p¯iin,t + ein,t − 2p˜nin,t)
]
= Et−1
1
2
Π˜pp
[
(Et−1ein,t − ein,t)(p¯nin,t + p¯iin,t + ein,t − 2p˜nin,t)
]
The equality follows because p¯nin,t = p¯
i
in,t +Et−1ein,t up to the first order. Using the definition of the covariance and
the fact that Et−1(Et−1ein,t − ein,t) = 0 we arrive at the cut-off rule (21).
32An implication of this point is that currency choice cannot be predicted solely by long-run pass-through or
desired pass-through on impact of the exchange rate shock. A firm, for instance, with a high flexible price (long-run)
pass-through can well choose local currency pricing if desired pass-through is low in the medium-run.
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pricing in the currency decison using data on currency invoicing of international trade for 24
countries. Consistent with Gopinath et al. (2010) they find that more homogenous goods are priced
in dollars, given the predominance of the dollar in trade transactions. Goldberg and Tille (2009)
use disaggregated data for Canadian imports and find that exporters tend to use the currency of
the country that dominates their industry. In addition they find that the Canadian dollar is used
more for larger shipments into Canada.33
Lastly, Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2005), Devereux et al. (2004), and Gopinath et al. (2010)
highlight the potential for multiple equilibria in the currency choice decision. Consider an environ-
ment where firms have an incentive to keep their price relative to their competitors prices stable
(high Γ). The currency choice decision depends on the currency of choice of the other firms. So
for instance if the marginal firm selling to the U.S. competes with firms that price in dollars, then
in response to movements in the U.S. NER its desired pass-through in dollars is low and it will
choose to price in dollars. If on the other hand its competitors all price in euros then its desired
pass-through in dollars will be high and it will be choose to price in euros.
4 Models with desired variable markups
We now illustrate a number of alternative models that have been used in the literature on inter-
national pricing in macroeconomic models that produce a negative relationship between markups
and relative price pin − pn, so that Γin > 0 in the model presented in the previous section.
To start, as a benchmark, we briefly describe the case of monopolistic competition and CES
demand. A continuum of intermediate goods, that in an abuse of notation we index by i are
combined in country n in amounts Qin to produce a final good Qn (or utility) according to the
constant returns to scale technology
Qn =
[∫
Ωn
A
1
θ
inQ
θ−1
θ
in di
] θ
θ−1
, θ > 1,
where Ωn denotes the set of available varieties in country n, and Ain denotes a taste parameter for
good i in country n. We introduce these taste parameters to allow for home-bias in consumption if
Ain < Ann for i 6= n. Cost minimization by the final good producer (or, equivalently, utility maxi-
mization by households) gives rise to the demand for variety i of the form Qin = Ain
(
Pin
Pn
)−θ
Qn,
where Pin is the price of variety i in country n, and Pn is the cost-minimizing aggregate price index
in country n given by Pn =
[∫
Ωn
Ain (Pin)
1−θ di
] 1
1−θ
. The demand elasticity is εin = θ. Profit max-
imization by a monopolistic producer i gives rise to a simple pricing rule with a constant markup
33To explain this finding Goldberg and Tille (2008) build a pricing and currency choice model based on bargaining
between the exporter and an importer that gets higher utility when facing stable prices in local currency.
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given by
µin = log
(
εin
εin − 1
)
= log
(
θ
θ − 1
)
.
Given that markups are constant, Γin = 0.
4.1 Non-CES demand
Kimball (1995) introduces a simple departure from CES using a homothetic aggregator over indi-
vidual varieties implicitly defined by:
1
|Ωn|
∫
Ωn
AinΥ
( |Ωn|Qin
AinQn
)
di = 1,
The function Υ satisfies the constraints Υ (1) = 1, Υ′ (.) > 0 and Υ′′ (.) < 0. Under CES,
Υ
( |Ωn|Qin
AinQn
)
=
(
Qin
AinQn
) θ−1
θ
. Cost minimization (or utility maximization) gives rise to the following
first-order-condition:
Pin = Υ
′
( |Ωn|Qin
AinQn
)
λn
Qn
,
where λn denotes the Lagrange multiplier. Expenditures over all varieties are given by
PnQn =
∫
Ωn
QinPindi = λnDn,
where Pn is the price index and Dn ≡
∫
Ωn
Υ′
( |Ωn|Qin
AinQn
)
Qin
Qn
di. Hence, the inverse demand function
for variety i in country n is
Υ′
( |Ωn|Qin
AinQn
)
= Dn
Pin
Pn
,
which can we inverted to obtain
Qin = Ainψ
(
Dn
Pin
Pn
)
Qn,
where ψ (.) = Υ′−1 (.) / |Ω| > 0 and ψ′ (.) < 0 applying the inverse derivative theorem and Υ′′ (.) <
0. In logs,
qin = ain + log (ψ (exp (xin))) + qn,
where xin = log (Dn) + pin − pn and ain = log (Ain). The demand elasticity is:
εin = −ψ
′ (.)
ψ (.)
DnPin
Pn
,
which can vary across firms depending on the shape of ψ (.). Note that ain does not directly affect
the demand elasticity.34
34Starting around an equilibrium in which εin is equal across all firms selling in country n, it is straightforward to
show that dDn = 0 up to a first-order-approximation.
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To put more structure on the dependance of εin on the relative price, Klenow and Willis (2006)
choose a specification Υ that results in a demand function:
log (ψ (x)) =
θ
η
log [1− ηx] .
The limit of log (ψx) as η −→ 0 is −θx as under CES. The demand elasticity is
εin = −∂ logψ (x)
∂x
=
θ
1− ηxin
which is constant when η = 0 and increasing in x when η > 0. The log markup is
µin = log
(
θ
θ − 1 + ηxin
)
and the elasticity of the markup with respect to the relative price is
Γin =
η
θ − 1 + ηxin .
Hence, when η > 0 markups are decreasing in the relative price. Note that the elasticity of the
markup with respect to relative price, Γin, varies systematically across firms. Specifically, markups
are more sentitive to relative prices pin − pn (i.e. Γin is higher) the lower is a firm’s relative price.
A similar relationship between markups and relative prices is implied by other commonly used
non-CES utility functions over a continuum of products such as quadratic (e.g. Melitz and Otta-
viano (2008)) or translog utility (e.g. Bergin and Feenstra (2001)).35
4.2 Strategic complementarities in pricing with CES demand
We now describe a setting with CES demand and a discrete number of products which gives rise
to variable markups of the form assumed above. This setting was originally studied in Dornbusch
(1987) and more recently in Atkeson and Burstein (2008).
Final sector output is modeled as a CES of the output of a continuum of sectors with elasticity
of substitution η and sector output is CES over a finite number of differentiated products with
elasticity θ, where 1 ≤ η ≤ θ. Firms own single products within each sector and compete in prices
(Bertrand). Taking as given prices of other firms in its sector, the elasticity of demand for good i
selling in country n in any given sector is
εin = ηsin + θ (1− sin) ,
where sin = exp (ain + (1− θ) (pin − pn)) represents the expenditure share of product i with taste
parameter ain in that sector and pn =
1
1−θ log (
∑
i exp (ain + (1− θ) pin)) is the log of the aggregate
35For other models of non-CES demand over a continuum of products, see e.g. Simonovska (2010) and Gust et al.
(2010). Arkolakis et al. (2012) consider the effects of international trade on markups in a general class of models
featuring a decreasing relationship between markups and relative prices.
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sector price. Note that, if η < θ, εin is decreasing in the expenditure share of the firm in that sector.
A firm with a small share assigns a larger weight to competitors in its same sector (high elasticity
of substitution) than to competitors in other sectors (low elasticity of substitution). A firm with a
higher share assigns a larger weight to firms in other sectors whose products are less substitutable,
thus facing a lower price-elasticity of demand.
The optimal markup (obtained by choosing price to maximize profits taking prices of other
firms in the sector as given) is
µin = log
(
ηsin + θ (1− sin)
ηsin + θ (1− sin)− 1
)
,
which is increasing in sin (and decreasing in pin − pn for a fixed ain) if θ > η.36 The elasticity of
the markup with respect to relative price is
Γin = (θ − η) (θ − 1) sin
[ηsin + θ (1− sin)] [ηsin + θ (1− sin)− 1] . (22)
which is positive if η < θ. That is firms with lower relative price, pin − pn, and higher expenditure
share, sin, set higher markups. Markups are more sensitive to relative prices pin − pn the higher is
a firm’s market share sin. These results are qualitatively unchanged if firms compete in quantities
(Cournot).37 Finally, note that with a finite number of positive-mass firms per sector, any change in
a product’s price pin has a non-zero effect on the aggregate sector price pn, so that in expression (24)
∆pn directly depends on ∆pin. Taking into account this effect, equation (10) becomes (assuming
constant returns to scale)
∆pin =
1
1 + (1− sin) Γin [∆wi + αin∆ein + (1− sin) Γin∆p−in]
where ∆p−in is an expenditure-weighted average of price changes in the sector exclusive of firm or
product i (in models with a continuum of firms, sin = 0). Markups are constant if sin = 0 or if
sin = 1. Hence, ERPT (both the direct effect and the sum of the direct and indirect effects) is
non-monotonic in size.
4.3 Distribution costs
We now consider a simple model of pricing with CES demand and additive distribution costs which
gives rise to variable markups of the form assumed above. This setting was originally explored in
Corsetti and Dedola (2005).
36See de Blas and Russ (2012) for an analytical characterization of the distribution of mark-ups as a function of
primitives in a related model.
37Under Cournot competition, εin =
(
sin
η
+ 1−sin
θ
)−1
and Γin = (θ − 1)
(
1
η
− 1
θ
)
µinsin, where sin and pn are
given by the same expressions as under Bertrand competition, and µin = log (εin/ (εin − 1)). Once again, Γin is
decreasing in pin − pn and increasing in sin.
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When country i firms sell to country n there is a retail (and wholesale) sector that bundles
the imported good with distribution services to bring it to the final consumer. Assuming that the
retail sector is competitive and combines the good and distribution services at fixed proportions,
the retail price (in levels) P rin is given by:
P rin = Pin + ηinP
d
n
where ηin denotes the fixed distribution cost per good. We assume that production of one unit of
distribution services uses one unit of the industry bundle, which implies P dn = Pn.
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In this setup, the presence of local distribution services immediately implies that retail prices
move less than one-to-one with changes in producer prices. Corsetti and Dedola (2005) show
that the presence of additive distribution costs can lead to variable markups at the producer
level. To see this, consider a CES demand at the retail level with elasticity of substitution θ:
Qin = Ain
(
P rin
Pn
)−θ
Qn, where Pn denotes the aggregate CES price inclusive of distribution costs.
The elasticity of demand country i firm faces when selling in country n is
εin = −∂ logQin
∂ logPin
= θ
(
1− sdin
)
where sdin =
ηinPn
Pin+ηinPn
denotes the share of distribution services in the retail price. The distribution
share and the elasticity of demand are both decreasing in the ratio of the firm’s producer price to
the local cost component Pin/Pn. The optimal mark-up for a monopolistic price-setter is:
µin = log
[
θ
(
1− sdin
)
θ
(
1− sdin
)− 1
]
= log
[
θ
θ − 1− ηin exp (− (pin − pn))
]
.
The elasticity of the markup with respect to the relative price pin − pn is
Γin =
1
θ−1
ηin exp(−(pin−pn)) − 1
=
1
(θ − 1) 1−sdin
sdin
− 1
. (23)
Clearly Γin = 0 if s
d
in = 0 and Γin > 0 if s
d
in > 0. Intuitively, as the firm raises its relative price,
that raises the elasticity of demand it faces and reduces its desired mark-up.39
Note from expression 23 that the elasticity of the markup with respect to relative price, Γin,
varies systematically across firms. Specifically, markups of firms with lower relative price pin − pn
(or higher distribution share sdin) are more sensitive to relative price.
38An alternative, standard assumption is that distribution services are produced using local labor instead of the
industry bundle. In such case, the markup is a decreasing function of the price relative to the wage, pin−wn, instead
of pin−pn. Markups in this case respond to changes in local wages and not directly to changes in the local aggregate
price. If there are positive trade costs or home bias in preferences (so that relative aggregate prices across countries
comove relative wages), the two models behave similarly.
39A necessary condition for Γin > 0 in this model is that the elasticity of substitution in the retail technology
between the good and distribution services be less than one. In the Cobb-Douglas case, Γin = 0.
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The specific models discussed above produce systematic differences in the elasticity of markup
to relative price Γin across firms from country i selling in country n. To recap, in the first model
(non-CES demand), the markup elasticity is higher for low relative price firms. In the second model
(CES demand with a finite number of firms), the markup elasticity is higher for higher market share
firms. In the third model (distribution costs), the markup elasticity is higher for firms with higher
distribution share. In all of these models, everything else the same, more productive firms have a
lower relative price, a higher expenditure share, and a higher markup elasticity.
What are the implied differences in the degree of ERPT across firms? From expression in
Proposition 2, we can see that, ceteris paribus, firms with higher markup elasticity, Γin, have a
smaller ERPT stemming from direct effects (changes in exchange rate at fixed aggregate prices and
quantities) but higher ERPT stemming from indirect effects (from changes in the aggregate prices
and quantities in the destination country). The net effect of a higher Γin on ERPT is ambiguous.
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If firms have a non-trivial effect on the industry aggregate price (as in the CES model with a finite
number of firms), there is an additional source of non-monotonicity of ERPT across firms described
above.
These model implications for how ERPT varies across heterogeneous firms have recently moti-
vated empirical work using detailed micro data that merges measures of ERPT and firm charac-
teristics. Berman et al. (2012) find evidence that higher productivity firms in France have lower
ERPT than low productivity firms.41 Similarly, Amiti et al. (2012) find evidence that Belgian ex-
porters with higher expenditures shares in the destination market have lower ERPT. This is both
because of the the markup channel (i.e. Γin) and because larger exporters import a larger fraction
of intermediate inputs that in turn lowers their sensitivity to bilateral exchange rate shocks, that
is they have a lower αin.
Goldberg and Hellerstein (2006), Hellerstein (2008), Goldberg and Verboven (2001), and Naka-
mura and Zerom (2010) develop structural models of international pricing featuring heterogeneous
consumer choosing among horizontally differentiated varieties that better suit their preferences.
These models, which give rise to richer and more flexible demand systems, are simulated and esti-
mated using detailed micro data and econometric methods that are standard in the field of industrial
organization. Goldberg and Hellerstein (2008) provide a recent survey of this work. These flexible
demand models typically do not generate simple closed form solutions for Γin or εin and, in contrast
to the models presented in this section, are less tractable to embed in general equilibrium setups
like the one presented in Section 7. Consumer heterogeneity gives rise to a potentially important
effect that is not present in the models described in this section. Specifically, when prices increase,
40Auer and Chaney (2009) present a model of pricing-to-market under perfect competition that features consumers
with heterogeneous preferences for quality. In equilibrium, ERPT is lower for high quality goods.
41Chatterjee et al. (2012), using Brazilian data, find similar results on ERPT across individual products exported
by multi-product firms.
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consumers with high demand elasticity exit the market causing average demand elasticity to fall
and mark-ups to rise. Hence, pass-through can be larger than 100%.
5 Other models of incomplete pass-through
We now discuss a number of alternative models of incomplete pass-through considered in the
literature that do not directly fit into the framework used above.
5.1 Consumer search
Search models, as formulated by Burdett and Judd (1983) in a closed-economy context and by
Alessandria (2009) in an international context, provide an alternative approach to obtaining variable
markups of a similar form of those in the framework above. Consumer-search limits consumer
arbitrage and can hence provide one rationalization for the observed dispersion of prices across
locations for identical products at a point of time.
In the model of Alessandria (2009), firms from each country produce a single good at a constant,
common marginal cost. Search is a costly activity that buyers in each country undertake to reduce
the expected cost of purchasing the good from each source country. In equilibrium, for every good
there is a distribution of prices in each country. Firms are indifferent between charging different
prices in the distribution: a higher price entails a higher markup but a lower expected quantity
sold. Alessandria (2009) shows that the average price posted by country i producers in country n
is
Pin = MCin + ηP
s
n,
where MCin denotes the marginal cost of all country i producers for sales to country n (expressed in
the currency of country n), P sn denotes the cost of a unit of search effort for a country n consumer,
and η is a parameter shaped by the search technology parameters.42 The higher is the consumer’s
cost of search effort, ηP sn, the higher is the average markup. The logarithm of the average markup
for country i producers selling to country n can be represented in terms of the notation used above
as
µin = log
(
Pin
MCin
)
= log
(
1 + η
1
1− exp (psn − pin)
)
.
If the cost of search effort is in terms of the aggregate good in each country (so that psn = pn)
we obtain a negative relationship between the average markup and the average price of country i
producers in country n relative to the aggregate price in country n, as in the previous models.43
42A similar relation hold for the average transacted prices, with a different mapping between parameters and η.
43If the search effort is in terms of time, then the negative relationship is between the average markup and the
price-wage ratio.
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Note that, since firms are indifferent between charging different markups in the distribution, the
markup elasticity Γin is not uniquely determined for each individual firm.
44
5.2 Customer accumulation
Incomplete pass-through from costs to prices may arise if firms face adjustment costs to expand
sales in any destination market. These adjustment costs may arise from investments in distribution
infrastructure, marketing, or other costs to the firm of expanding its customer base. In response
to a depreciation of the Euro against the U.S. dollar, a German exporter to the U.S. will not
find it optimal to fully reduce its dollar price if there is no capacity to meet additional demand.
This insight was initially developed in Krugman (1987) and later embedded in dynamic general
equilibrium models by Kasa (1992) and Lapham (1995).
More recently, Drozd and Nosal (2012b) build an international business cycle model in which
producers face costs to match with additional retailers in each market, while retailers search in
an undirected way for domestic and foreign producers. Once matched, Nash bargaining between
producers and retailers result in a producer price given by
Pin = (1− η)MCin + ηP rin,
where MCin denotes the marginal of production expressed in country n’s currency, P
r
in the retail
price, and 0 < η < 1 the bargaining power of retailers. That is, as in previous models, there is an
additive local component (P rin) that disconnects prices from costs. An appreciation of the Euro that
increases marginal costs of a German exporter in U.S. dollars relative to the retail price in the U.S.,
results in incomplete ERPT into border prices. Deviations from relative PPP for German goods
sold in Germany and the U.S. occur if retail prices P rin change across countries when measured in
a common currency. Drozd and Nosal (2012b) show that changes in relative retail prices across
countries arise from two forces. First, from changes across countries in the local cost of increasing
the number of matches (this destination-specific cost component operates similarly to distribution
costs described above). Second, from adjustment costs to the accumulation of matches. Intuitively,
if adjustment costs are large, retail quantities do not change much in the short-run, and neither do
retail prices. Over time, as quantities adjust, deviations from relative PPP become smaller. Drozd
and Nosal (2012b) discipline the degree of adjustment costs to account for the observed differences
between (low) short-run and (high) long-run price elasticity of international trade flows (see e.g.
Ruhl (2008)).
Relatedly, and building on the partial equilibrium models of pricing-to-market with consumer
switching costs developed in Froot and Klemperer (1989), Ravn et al. (2007) present a dynamic
44Alessandria and Kaboski (2011) argue that the search mechanism can partly account for differences in price levels
between rich and poor countries.
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model of pricing-to-market stemming from preferences with habit formation at the level of individual
varieties. In particular, preferences are given by
Qn,t =
[∫
Ωn
(
Qin,t − ηQin,t−1
) θ−1
θ
in,t
di
] θ
θ−1
,
where Qin,t = ρQin,t−1 + (1− ρ) Q˜in,t denotes the stock of habit for good i in country n, and Q˜in,t
denotes average consumption of this good (which each consumer takes parametrically and equals
Qin,t in a symmetric equilibrium). Utility maximixation results in demand for good i in country n
at time t of the form
Qin,t =
(
Pin,t
Pn,t
)−θ
Qn,t + ηQin,t−1.
The price-elasticity εin is a weighted average of θ and 0, where the weight on θ is increasing in
expected future sales. When the present value of future sales rises in a country, firms selling there
have incentives to invest in market share by lowering current markups. Any shock that increases the
present value of sales in U.S. relative to Germany reduces markups in U.S. relative to Germany for
any traded good. Ravn et al. (2006) show that, in response to an increase in government spending
in the U.S., the CPI-based RER depreciates in the U.S., and prices for any traded good rise in
Germany relative to the U.S., consistent with the correlations summarized in Finding 5. Drozd
and Nosal (2012a) show, however, that the ability of this model to reproduce the correlations in
Finding 5 are sensitive to the source of aggregate shocks.45
5.3 Inventories
Alessandria et al. (2010), as discussed previously, show that in the case of goods that are storable the
retail or wholesale price of imported goods can be disconnected from the border price. Pass-through
from changes in import prices into retail or wholesale prices can be incomplete even with CES
preferences that in the baseline model without inventories generate full pass-through. Specifically,
when a good is storable and firms face shipping lags and fixed costs of importing, they choose to
import infrequently and hold inventories. These frictions are carefully documented in Alessandria
et al. (2010). Holding inventories is not costless because goods depreciate if not sold. As derived
in Alessandria et al. (2010) the retail or wholesale price charged by a monopolist is given by
prin =
θ
θ − 1Vs(s)
where Vs is the value of an additional increment of stock of inventories. Therefore, prices in general
depend on the firm’s current stock of inventories. When the firm decides to import goods to add
to inventories, then Vs = pin, where pin is the marginal cost of importing another unit. In this case
45Dynamics models of incomplete pass-through have implications in terms of how the degree of pricing-to-market
varies with the permanence of movements in exchange rates.
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there is 100% pass-through from changes in border prices into wholesale or retail prices. When
the level of inventories is high, Vs < pin, that is the firm will choose to price at lower than the
replacement cost because its inventories are too high. In response to an increase in the border
price pin, a firm may find itself with too much inventories, in which case Vs < pin and pass-
through is incomplete. Note that in response to a decline in the border prices, pass-through will be
complete if firms choose to sell more or to replenish their inventories. Hence, this model generates
an asymmetry in the extent of pass-through to increases and decreases in the border price pin.
Thus far we have mainly focused on the partial equilibrium problem of a firm from country i
selling in country n. We now examine the industry equilibrium and a general equilibrium environ-
ment.
6 Industry equilibrium
How does the aggregate industry price respond to exchange rate movements? We calculate the
log change in the aggregate price index in country n, ∆pn, as an expenditure-weighted average of
changes in all prices of goods sold in country n. This definition corresponds to the change in the
CPI for an industry calculated at producer prices, as well as the change in the aggregate industry
price, up to a first order approximation, in the type of models described in section 4.
To calculate the first-order change in the aggregate price index, we make some simplifying
assumptions: there are constant returns to scale (mcq = 0) and in the initial equilibrium all firms
within each country are homogeneous so that Γin is equal across all producers from country i selling
in country n and αin = αni = 1. The following proposition presents the change in the aggregate
price when prices are flexible:
Proposition 7 If all firms within each country are homogeneous and mcq = 0, then the log change
in the aggregate price, when prices are flexible, is
∆pn =
∑
j
sjn
1 + Γjn
−1∑
i
sin
1 + Γin
(∆wi + ∆ein) , (24)
and the change in quantity sold from country i to country n is
∆qin =
εin
1 + Γin
(∆wi + ∆ein −∆pn) + ∆qn, (25)
where sin denotes the total expenditure share of country i producers selling in country n. From
expression (24) we can observe that an increase in the marginal cost (in U.S. dollars) affecting a
larger expenditure share of firms selling into the U.S. results in a larger increase in the aggregate
price and, through the indirect effects on ERPT, a higher increase in any country j’s prices into
country n.
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If markets in countries m and n are not segmented in the sense that sjn = sjm, Γjn = Γjm
for all j, then the industry aggregate RER is constant, ∆pm + ∆emn − ∆pn = 0. According to
expression (11), relative markups between these two countries are constant for any traded good,
even if Γin > 0. Hence, trade costs or home bias in preferences that segment markets across
countries are essential to obtain pricing-to-market, as discussed in Atkeson and Burstein (2008).
From expression (24) we can also observe that if Γjn = Γn, then for given changes in wages and
exchange rates, the change in the aggregate price is independent of Γn and hence is the same as
if markups are constant, Γn = 0. To understand why Γn does not affect the change in aggregate
prices, suppose that country n’s currency depreciates against country i’s currency, ∆ein > 0, while
∆wj = 0. The higher is Γn, the lower is ERPT in country n for imports from country i, but the
higher is the increase in prices by all other producers selling to country n.
This result can be related to expression (8) for movements in CPI-based RERs for tradeable
goods. A higher markup elasticity Γn increases the movements in export prices relative to producer
prices, ∆epin −∆ppin, contributing to larger movements in rertrin, but also reduces movements in
PPI’s across countries, ∆ppiii + ∆ein−∆ppinn, contributing to smaller movements in rertrin. When
Γjn = Γn, these effects exactly offset each other and movements in rer
tr
in are not affected by the
markup elasticity for given changes in wages and exchange rates.
While the markup elasticity does not affect the response in aggregate prices to given changes
in wages and exchange rates across countries, it does affect the response of quantities as can be
seen in expression (25). In particular, a higher markup elasticity Γin reduces the effects of a change
in exchange rates on relative quantities in the same way as a reduction in the price elasticity of
demand, εin, does.
The irrelevance of Γin for aggregate price movements is an outcome of flexible prices. When
prices adjust infrequently, as in the data, Γin affects the price response. Assume that there are only
two countries i and n. Reset prices are given by (16). The aggregate price in country n is given by:
pn,t = κpn,t−1 + (1− κ)pn,t (26)
where
pn,t = s
mpin,t + (1− sm)pnn,t (27)
and sm represents the import share of spending in each country (sm = s21 in country 1 and s
m = s12
in country 2). Assuming that countries are symmetric, sm = s21 = s12, Γin = Γnn = Γni = Γ, after
some algebraic manipulation (derived in the appendix) we arrive at the following expressions for
the evolution of producer price inflation in country n:46
∆pn,t − βEt∆pn,t+1 = (1− κ) (1− βκ)
κ (1 + Γ)
[sm (wi,t + ein,t) + (1− sm) wn,t − pn,t] (28)
46These assumptions allow for home bias in consumption stemming from differences in preference parameters,
Ain < Ann.
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Using the definition of the real exchange rate, rerin,t = ein,t+pi,t−pn,t and combining the previous
two expressions we arrive at the following expression for the evolution of the real exchange rate:
∆rerin,t − βEt∆rerin,t+1 = ∆ein,t − βEt∆ein,t+1 (29)
+
(1− κ) (1− βκ)
κ (1 + Γ)
[(1− 2sm)(wi,t + ein,t − wn,t)− rerin,t]
For given paths of wages and exchange rates, a higher Γ works the same way as a higher κ, as it
reduces the response of the firm changing prices to the exchange rate shock.
7 General equilibrium
In the previous sections we described mechanisms through which prices adjust incompletely and
gradually to exchange rate shocks and generate relative price movements for the same good across
different markets. We adopted a partial equilibrium approach, focusing on the problem of a firm
and solving for industry equilibrium. We modeled the cost components of the firm including the
exchange rate shock and wages as exogenous variables. In this section we describe one standard
form of closing the model to endogenize wages and exchange rates. Movements in real and nominal
exchange rates are driven by monetary shocks, motivated by the evidence presented in Mussa
(1986). This is the approach adopted in Chari et al. (2002), Kehoe and Midrigan (2007), Carvalho
and Nechio (2011), among others.
Here we sketch the main features of the general equilibrium model and spell out more details
in the appendix. There are two ex-ante symmetric countries. Households in each country derive
utility from leisure and consumption of tradeable and non-tradeable goods, and have access to a
complete set of state-contingent assets. To sell tradeable goods, a competitive distribution sector
combines them with nontradeable goods. Tradeable and non-tradeable consumption goods are each
composed of a continuum of differentiated goods according to a non-CES aggregator of the form
described in section 4.1. Differentiated goods are produced using a symmetric technology that is
linear in labor so that marginal cost is (wi+ein). We consider two alternative assumptions on price
and wage rigidity. In section 7.1 we consider the case of flexible wages and price rigidity in local
currency and in section 7.2 we present the case of rigid wages and flexible prices.
7.1 Local currency pricing
Monopolistically competitive firms set prices in each country that are sticky in the currency of the
buyer. For a given path of wages and exchange rates, the dynamics of prices and RER for tradeable
(at the producer level) and non-tradeable goods is represented by equations (28) and (29), where
sm = 0 for nontradeable goods.
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Labor supply is determined by the consumers’ intra-temporal labor-leisure decisions, which
under a utility function of the form U(C,N) =
C1−σi
1−σ −
L1+γi
1+γ is given by
σci,t + γli,t = wi,t − pci,t (30)
where 1/γ is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, and pci,t is the aggregate consumer price in country
i (including tradeable and nontradeable goods). Up to a first-order approximation, ∆pci,t = ∆cpii,t.
With complete asset markets, risk sharing implies
σ (cn,t − ci,t) = ein,t + pci,t − pcn,t = rerin,t (31)
where rerin,t is the consumer price based RER. Combining risk sharing and labor supply, we obtain:
wi,t + ein,t − wn,t = γ (li,t − ln,t) . (32)
The nominal side of the economy is modeled using a money growth (∆mi,t) rule and a cash-in-
advance constraint:
∆mi,t = ρm∆mi,t−1 + σmi,t
where εi,t are iid shocks. The cash in advance constraint is given by,
pci,t + ci,t = mi,t (33)
The following proposition, derived in Carvalho and Nechio (2011), analytically characterizes
the first-order dynamics of RERs (taking into account the endogenous determination of wages and
exchange rates) under certain parameter restrictions.47
Proposition 8 When σ = 1, γ = 0, αin = αni = 1 and Γ = 0, the real exchange rate is given by
(1− ρmL)(1− κL)rerin,t =
(
κ− (1− κ) ρmβκ
1− ρmβκ
)
uin,t
and the nominal exchange rate follows
∆ein,t = ρm∆ein,t−1 + uin,t
where uin,t ≡ σm(n,t − i,t).
One measure of the persistence of the real exchange rate is given by the sum of autoregressive
roots: P = 1− (1− ρm)(1− κ). The persistence of the RER is increasing in the persistence of the
money growth rate and in the frequency of non-adjustment κ.48 When ρm = 0 there is a one-to-one
47Kehoe and Midrigan (2007) derive a similar expression for the case when ρm = 0.
48Carvalho and Nechio (2011) show that a multi-sector model with sectoral heterogeneity in the frequency of price
adjustment will tend to generate larger aggregate RER persistence than a one sector model with the average sectoral
frequency of price adjustment.
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mapping between the RER persistence and the frequency κ. Kehoe and Midrigan (2007) find a
positive but weak relationship between these two statistics using data for a number of developed
countries. However, as is evident in the case when ρm is high the effect of variations in κ can be
small.
More generally, when Γ 6= 0 and γ 6= 0 there is no simple closed form solution for the real
exchange rate that evolves according to (29). In Figure 3 we graph the half-life (in quarters) for
the RER as a function of Γ.49 As expected, the higher is Γ the longer is the half life.
With only price rigidity and with flexible wages this model implies a close tie between exchange
rates and relative wages at high frequencies. According to (32), if the Frisch elasticity is infinite,
relative wages (measured in a common currency) are constant, independent of the source of the
shock. If the Frisch elasticity is finite, countries that expand experience an increase in relative
wages. It is difficult to reconcile these movements (or lack of) in relative wages with Findings 1,2
and 3 that relied on the disconnect between non-traded prices (and hence wages) and exchange
rates. In addition, with sticky local currency prices a devaluation leads to an increase in export
prices relative to import prices and the real trade balance deteriorates in the case when prices
are rigid in the local currency and wages are flexible. One standard way of disconnecting wages
and non-traded good prices from exchange-rates in the short run is to allow for sticky wages. We
describe this extension in the next subsection.
The impulse responses to a permanent money growth shock that induces a 1% depreciation
of the nominal exchange rate in country 1 in the new steady state are depicted in Figure 4. The
values represent log percentage deviations from the initial steady state. Relative wages (measured
in a common currency) remain constant across countries. With local currency prices adjusting
sluggishly, the terms of trade (price of imports relative to exports) appreciates and the real trade
balance (defined as the difference between the quantity of exports and imports) deteriorates for the
country that experiences an exchange rate depreciation (country 1). This is because, with local
currency pricing, there is limited expenditure switching in the short-run so the standard channel
that generates an improvement in the trade balance (as would be the case for producer currency
pricing) is no longer effective. The deterioration in trade balance in country 1 arises because the
shock generates an increase in overall consumption in country 1 while it remains unchanged in
country 2, thus increasing imports in country 1 relative to exports. Employment rises in country 1
and remains approximately unchanged in country 2.
While the model can generate a persistent, hump-shaped response of the RER, it does not
reproduce the rankings of ERPT and movements in tradeable RER (based on consumer, producer,
49For this figure, we assume κ = 0.75, ρm = 0.5, β = 0.99, σ = 1 and γ = 0. Given that with σ = 1 and γ = 0
the price dynamics are equal for tradeables and nontradeables, the share of nontradeables in consumption, the share
of distribution costs, and the elasticity of substitution between tradeable and nontradeable goods do not affect these
results.
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and border prices) reviewed in Findings 2 and 3, or the relative movements of the terms of trade
and PPI-based RER reviewed in Finding 5. This is because relative costs (and hence the relative
price of domestically produced goods) remain constant across countries.
7.2 Wage rigidity
A textbook treatment of this extension can be found in Gal´ı (2008). Each household is assumed
to supply a differentiated variety of labor and there is monopolistic competition among the various
types of labor. The aggregate labor composite is
Li,t =
[∫ 1
0
Li,t(h)
η−1
η dh
] η
η−1
where η is the elasticity of substitution across labor varieties. Firm’s demand for each variety is
then given by:
Li,t(h) =
(
Wi,t(h)
Wi,t
)−η
Li,t (34)
Wi,t =
[∫ 1
0
Wi,t(h)
1−ηdh
] 1
1−η
The staggered wage setting problem of household h is to maximize
Et
{ ∞∑
l=0
(βκw)
l U(Ci,t+l(h), Li,t+l(h))
}
subject to labor demand (34) and its budget constraint. Following standard steps as in Gal´ı (2008)
we have the optimal reset wage for each household (given symmetry we drop h) given by
w¯i,t = (1− βκw)
∞∑
l=0
(βκw)
l Et
{
mrsi,t+l + p
c
i,t+l
}
where mrs is the log of the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labor supply.
We solve for the dynamics of the wage following similar steps as in the derivation of (28).
Figure 5 depicts impulse responses for the case when wages are rigid and prices are flexible.50
In response to a depreciation of the currency in country 1, the wage falls in country 1 relative to
country 2, and so does the price of domestically produced goods. The terms of trade depreciates
and the real trade balance improves in country 1. This follows because of the expenditure switching
effect as consumers in both countries increase their relative demand for country 1 output. This
effect outweighs the change in imports stemming from the rise in consumption in country 1 relative
to country 2. Employment increases in both countries.
50For this figure, we assume κ = 0, κw = 0.75, ρm = 0.5, β = 0.99, σ = 1, γ = 0, price elasticity (elasticity between
domestic and foreign goods) ε = 1.5, import share in tradeables (exlusive of distribution) sm = 0.25, distribution
share in tradeables sd = 0.5, and expenditure share of tradeables in total consumption str = 0.5.
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The model reproduces the rankings of ERPT and movements in tradeable RER constructed
(based on consumer prices, producer prices, and border prices) reviewed in Findings 2 and 3, as
well as the relative movements of the terms of trade and PPI based RER reviewed in Finding
5. Clearly, matching all the findings described in the empirical section including infrequent price
adjustment in the local currency requires a combination of both price and wage rigidity.
The literature has pointed out a number of important limitations of this model in terms of its
implications on the relation between exchange rates and other macro variables. First, equation
(31) implies a perfect correlation between RERs and relative consumption, while in the data it is
much closer to zero (see e.g. Backus and Smith (1993)) 51. Second, the model implies a relation
between exchange rates and interest rates across countries that satisfies uncovered interest parity,
which does not appear to hold in the data (see e.g. Fama (1984)). Third, and more generally, this
model implies a counterfactually strong relation between exchange rates and macro variables at
short and medium horizons, which is referred to as the “exchange rate disconnect” puzzle (see e.g.
Baxter and Stockman (1989), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000)). The model abstracts from non-monetary
shocks, real, financial, expectation and information-based, etc. that may be important drivers of
nominal exchange rates. For a broad survey of the literature on exchange rate determination and
fundamentals we refer the reader to the chapter by Charles Engel in this handbook and also to the
book by Evans (2011). Overall, the general equilibrium literature in open economy macro has yet
to deliver theoretical models that generate predictions consistent with the empirical findings while
matching the exchange rate disconnect phenomenon.
8 Conclusion
What does the literature teach us about the positive and normative issues raised in the introduction?
On the question of deviations from relative PPP the takeaway is that for retail prices this has much
less to do with inefficient relative price movements of the exact same good across locations. It has
more to do with the fact that a large fraction of prices are of non-tradeable goods or only locally
consumed tradeable goods. At the same time for developed countries for the subset of goods that are
actually traded, there is evidence that firms do price to market by charging (inefficiently) different
mark-ups, despite costs being the same. It is yet to be determined how large the aggregate welfare
impact of these inefficient relative price movements is given the relatively small share of the pure
traded goods component in total consumption.
As for the question of ERPT and expenditure switching, once again retail prices are not very
sensitive to exchange rate movements. For border prices there is higher pass-through and the fact
that it takes multiple rounds of price adjustment for ERPT to attain its long-run value suggests
51Corsetti and Leduc (2008) show that this correlation can be matched to the data in a model with incomplete
markets and a very low elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods
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an important role for real rigidities in pricing. The magnitude of ERPT also depends on whether
the country’s currency is used in trade transactions. Since most developing countries trade in a
currency that is not their own, ERPT in these countries tends to be higher than for developed
countries like the U.S. for which 90% of its imports are priced in dollars.
Given local currency price stability for retail prices the ability of flexible exchange rates to
generate large expenditure switching at the consumer level is limited for small to moderate exchange
rate movements. It is possibly higher for intermediate inputs at the producer level or for large
devaluations that coincide with large contractions in economic activity. To provide a more definite
conclusion on the extent of expenditure switching it is important to address the relationships
between prices and quantities in the data.52
As for the debate on fixed versus floating exchange rates, the fact that firms mimic the short-
run flexible price benchmark by choosing their border pricing currency optimally may reduce the
welfare gap between floating exchange rates and pegs.
9 Appendix
Industry and General equilibrium with nominal rigidities
In this appendix we provide additional details on the aggregate industry model of section 6 and
on the general equilibrium model of section 7. We present log-linear approximations (around the
non-stochastic steady state) of the equations that determine the model dynamics. We first consider
the one sector model of section 6 under the general equilibrium assumptions of section 7. Next,
we consider a two-sector (tradeables and non-tradeables) version of this model that we relate to
the empirical findings. Throughout this appendix we assume that countries are symmetric so that
in the initial steady-state, the elasticity, the markup, and the markup elasticity are equal across
countries and producers selling in each country: εin = ε, µin = µ, and Γin = Γ.
One sector model
We first embed the one sector model of section 6 in general equilibrium. For a given path of
wages and exchange rates, the dynamics of the reset price for producers from each country is given,
up to a first-order approximation, by expression (16), which can be re-written as
pin,t = (1− βκ)
(wi,t + ein,t + Γpn,t + constin)
1 + Γ
+ βκEtpin,t+1. (35)
Aggregate source-country specific prices (or import price indices ipiin,t) follow the law-of-motion
pin,t = κpin,t−1 + (1− κ)pin,t (36)
52Cravino (2012) uses detailed Chilean exports to measure the response of prices and quantities to exchange rate
movements for goods priced in different currencies and sold in a given destination. Even though exchange rate
movements induce large changes in relative prices between goods priced in different currencies, expenditure switching
is on average quite limited.
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The aggregate producer price with two-symmetric countries n is
pn,t = smpin,t + (1− sm)pnn,t. (37)
Expression (28) is obtained as follows. Combining (35) and (37), we have
pn,t =
(1− βκ)
1 + Γ
(pˆn,t + Γpn,t) + βκEtpn,t+1, (38)
where
pˆn,t = s
mein,t + (1− sm)wn,t + smwi,t + constant , for i 6= n.
Using equation (36),
pn,t − pn,t−1 = (1− κ) (p¯n,t − pn,t−1)
= (1− κ)
(
(1− βκ)
1 + Γ
(pˆn,t + Γpn,t) + βκ
(
Etpn,t+1 − pn,t
)
+ βκpn,t − pn,t−1
)
= (1− κ)
(
(1− βκ)
1 + Γ
(pˆn,t + Γpn,t) + βκ
(
Etpn,t+1 − κpn,t
1− κ − pn,t
)
+ βκpn,t − pn,t−1
)
= (1− κ)
(
(1− βκ)
1 + Γ
(pˆn,t − pn,t) + pn,t − pn,t−1
)
+ βκ (Etpn,t+1 − pn,t)
and combining terms we obtain expression (28):
∆pn,t − βEt∆pn,t+1 = (1− κ) (1− βκ)
κ (1 + Γ)
(pˆn,t − pn,t) . (39)
Consumption of any good (domestic or foreign) requires distribution costs in terms of the final
good. At this point we only assume that consumption and distribution costs are combined through
some constant returns to scale technology. Under these assumptions, the price and quantity of final
consumption are proportional to the price and quantity of production of the final good,
cn,t = qn,t + constant
pcn,t = pn,t + constant (40)
Aggregate consumption, given money supply and the aggregate price level, is determined from
the cash in advance constraint (33). Given aggregate prices and consumption, aggregate quantities
of country i goods sold in country n are given, to a first-order approximation, by
qin,t = −ε (pin,t − pn,t) + qn,t. (41)
Labor-market clearing requires that labor used for domestic production and for exporting must
equal total labor ln,t. The condition for labor market clearing in country n can be expressed, up
to a first-order approximation (ignoring higher-order productivity losses from price dispersion), as
ln,t = (1− sm) qnn,t + smqni,t. (42)
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To close the model, wages in each country must be consistent with labor supply (30) and the
nominal exchange rate with the risk sharing condition (31).53
This finishes the description of the equations that are required to solve for all endogenous
variables in the model. Equations (35) and (36) conform a second-order difference equation that
must be solved using standard methods.
Note that in this one-sector general equilibrium model we have not specified the details that
give rise to variable markups. Given other parameters (including the elasticity ε), variable markups
only matter through the markup elasticity Γ in equation (35).
Proof of Proposition 8: The proof here follows Carvalho and Nechio (2011) closely. When σ = 1
and γ = 0 it follows from equations (30)-(33) that wi,t+ein,t = wn,t and wi,t = mi,t in both countries.
The assumption that money growth follows an AR(1) process implies Et∆mi,t+` = ρ`e∆mi,t. Using
these results, equation (16) can be written as
p¯in,t = p¯nn,t = p¯n,t = mn,t +
ρmβκ
1− ρmβκ(mn,t −mn,t−1).
The aggregate price index in country n is
pn,t = κpn,t−1 + (1− κ)p¯n,t
= κpn,t−1 + (1− κ)
(
mn,t +
ρmβκ
1− ρmβκ(mn,t −mn,t−1)
)
.
The real exchange rate can be expressed, using the equivalence between producer and consumer
prices in equation (40), as
rerin,t = p
c
i,t + ein,t − pcn,t
= κ · rerin,t−1 +
(
κ− (1− κ) ρmβκ
1− ρmβκ
)
∆ein,t
Given that ein,t = mn,t −mi,t, we have ∆ein,t = ρm∆ein,t−1 + uin,t where uin,t ≡ σm(n,t − i,t).
Using the lag operator notation ∆ein,t =
uin,t
1−ρmL and rerin,t − κrerin,t−1 = (1 − κL)rerin,t and
substituting into the previous equation we arrive at the main expression in the proposition.
Two sector model
We introduce a non-tradeable final good because, as discussed under empirical finding 2, move-
ments in the price of traded goods (at border prices) relative to nontraded goods account for a
non-trivial share of overal RER movements. Final consumption in country n is a Cobb-Douglass
composite of consumption of the tradeable and non-tradeable final good,
cn,t = s
trctrn,t +
(
1− str) cntrn,t ,
53Assuming instead financial autarky (trade balance equal to zero) instead of complete asset markets, expression
(31) is substituted by ein,t + pin,t + qin,t = pni,t + qni,t.
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The final good price is a composite of the retail tradeable price index and the non-tradeable price
index:
pcn,t = s
trprn,t +
(
1− str) pntrn,t .
We assume that each unit of final tradeable consumption requires a fixed number of units of
distribution costs in the form of the final non-traded good. The retail tradeable price index is, up
to a first order approximation
prn,t =
(
1− sd
)
ptrn,t + s
dpntrn,t .
Given prices and consumption, tradeable and non-tradeable consumption are given by
cntrn,t = p
c
n,t + cn,t − pntrn,t
ctrn,t = p
c
n,t + cn,t − prn,t
With two sectors, we have a reset price and an aggregate price for each sector. That is, equations
(35), (36), (37) apply separately for tradeables and nontradeables, where sm = 0 for non-tradeables.
Note that, in equation (35) the term Γpn,t indicates that markups depend on a firm’s price relative
to the aggregate price index in its sector. This formulation depends on the particular specification of
variable markups. It is consistent with non-CES demand such as the Kimball aggregator described
in section 4.1. On the other hand, in the model of variable markups with distribution costs in
section 4.3, the price index multiplying Γ in expression (35) would be pntrn,t if distribution costs use
non-tradeable goods. Hence, in using equation (35) with the term Γpn,t, we are assuming that
variable markups result from a non-CES aggregator as in section 4.1, and that distribution costs
do not affect markups because they apply to the final tradeable good.
Labor-market clearing requires that labor used for domestic production of tradeable goods, ex-
ports, and production of nontradeable goods (including nontradeable consumption and distribution
costs which are proportional to tradeable consumption) must equal total labor ln,t. This condition
can be expressed as:
ln,t = s
tr(1− sd) [(1− sm) qnn,t + smqin,t] + strsdctrn,t +
(
1− str) cntrn,t ,
where qin,t denotes the aggregate quantity of country i tradeable goods sold in country n, given by
qin = −ε
(
ptrin,t − ptrn,t
)
+ ctrn .
Other market clearing conditions that determine wages and exchange rates are the same as in the
one-sector model.
Recall that if σ = 1 and γ = 0 (as in proposition 9), relative wages between countries are
constant. In this case it is straightforward to show that in response to a monetary shock as the one
considered in section 7, the aggregate price of tradeable and non-tradeable goods change by the
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same amount. This explains the price patterns in Figure 4: the rise in prices is equal for tradeable
prices at the border ptrin,t, tradeable prices at the consumer level p
r
in,t, as well as the overall consumer
price pcn,t.
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B: US CPI-based RER: Overall and tradeable-based
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Figure 1: Relation between CPI based, PPI based and Terms of Trade based RER and NER
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Figure 2: Foreign PPI versus IPI
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Figure 3: Half lives (in quarters) of the RER as a function of Γ
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Figure 4: Impulse Responses to money growth shock: Sticky local currency prices, flexible wages
65
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
NER
quarters
 
 
NER
Relative unit labor costs
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
CPI−based RER, Half−life = 8
 
 
NER
CPI−based RER
0 5 10 15 20
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Tradeable RER
 
 
CPI−based RER
CPI−based RERT
IPI−based RERT
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Prices
 
 
NER
IPI
Imports CPI
Tradeable CPI
Overall CPI
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Terms of trade
 
 
PPI−RER
ToT
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Employment and real trade balance country
 
 
Employment country 1
Employment country 2
Real exports − imports ctry 1
Figure 5: Impulse Responses to money growth shock: Sticky wages, flexible prices
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